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THE RIPPLE EFFECT OF SEVENTH
AMENDMENT DECISIONS ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SUBSTANTIVE PATENT LAW
Eileen M. Herlihyt
Abstract
In determining whether a judge or jury should decide particular
issues in patent cases, the Federal Circuit has placed too much
emphasis on reaching outcomes perceived to be beneficial from a
policy perspective and too little emphasis on performing analyses that
are consistent with Supreme Court Seventh Amendment precedent.
The irony is that, in the course of reaching Seventh Amendment
outcomes perceived to foster certainty and uniformity, the Federal
Circuit has engaged in expedient and unprincipled analyses that have
themselves spawned widespread problems in substantive patent law.
This article examines the ripple effect of statements and
intermediate conclusions set forth in the course of flawed Seventh
Amendment analyses in the Federal Circuit's decisions in Markman
and Hilton Davis. In relying principally on a fact versus law
approach to Seventh Amendment issues in patent cases, an approach
not employed by the Supreme Court in addressing such issues, the
Federal Circuit has generated faulty and inadequately supported
statements and intermediate conclusions that have adversely affected
substantive law. Compounding the problem, the Supreme Court has
shown excessive deference to the Federal Circuit in this area.
This article addresses the impact of the Federal Circuit's faulty
Seventh Amendment analyses on the substantive law in three areas
related to claim scope: claim construction, the doctrine of equivalents
and prosecution history estoppel. In each of these areas, statements
and intermediate conclusions contained in the flawed Seventh
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Amendment analyses have created confusion, tension and conflict in
the substantive law. The adverse impact has affected a host of issues
ranging from the proper role of one of ordinary skill in the art, to the
tension between claim scope under the doctrine of equivalents and
claim construction. As a result, there is a pressing need to correct the
Federal Circuit's faulty statements and intermediate conclusions,
which have been consistently applied and reapplied in cases, and
revisit the Seventh Amendment issue in Hilton Davis which was left
undecided by the Supreme Court.
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INTRODUCTION
Most people would agree that the best way to treat a sick patient
is to diagnose the underlying cause of the illness and treat the root
cause rather than the symptoms. This approach to treating patients is
generally applicable to solving problems. It is usually more effective
to identify and address the root causes of a problem than to deal
individually with all of the ramifications of the problem. Of course,
the key to success under this approach is the accuracy of the
diagnosis.
In patent law, there are a number of problem areas that have
raised serious concern in recent years. Those involved in science,
industry and business have sounded an alarm over the failures of the
patent system to provide a realistic incentive for innovation.' There is
a growing concern that the balance between providing an incentive
for innovation through patent protection, on the one hand, and the
need to give the public fair notice of patent coverage in order to allow
individuals and businesses to make reliable decisions, on the other
hand, is out of kilter.2 Since 2005 there have been repeated attempts
in Congress to pass patent reform legislation without success. 3
Prominent critics warn that the patent system is broken.4
In particular, the law related to the scope of patent coverage,
1. See, e.g., Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit - A Reminiscence, 14 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 513 (1992) (Judge Newman of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
describes activity related to a past Domestic Policy Review of Industrial Innovation and the
eventual creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.); Donald W. Banner, Witness
At The Creation, 14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 557 (1992) (Banner, a past Chairman of the
Intergovernmental Task Force on Patents and Information, describes his testimony during
congressional hearings to address a perceived slow down in technological innovation and to
stimulate investments in industry by strengthening the patent system.); ADVISORY COMM. ON
INDUS. INNOVATION, REPORT ON PATENT POLICY 147-99 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce February 6,
1979).
2. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (Princeton Univ. Press 2008).
3. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005); Patent Reform Act of
2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006); Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 11 0th Cong. (2007)
(as amended by House, Sept. 4, 2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 1 10th Cong. (2007)
(as amended by Senate, Jan. 24, 2008); Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong.
(2008); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009,
S. 515, 111 th Cong. (2009) (as amended on Apr. 2, 2009, by S. Comm. on the Judiciary). See
also Harold C. Wegner, Judicial Patent Reform in the 111th Congress: New Solutions for
Known Problems 3, 16-24 (2009),
http://www.ipfrontline.com/downloads/AkronConferenceWegnerPaper.pdf.
4. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (Princeton Univ. Press 2008).
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including claim construction, the doctrine of equivalents, and
prosecution history estoppel, is considered to be in dire straits. Patent
claims generally define patent rights5 and the law regarding the
proper interpretation of patent claims has been frequently criticized as
being, at best, confusing and, at worst, contradictory.6 The reversal
rates for trial court claim construction decisions are high,7 and this is
considered by many to reflect a lack of clarity in the law of claim
construction.8 Moreover, the doctrine of equivalents, a legal theory
under which the scope of patent coverage may encompass more than
the literal breadth of patent claims as far as the right to exclude is
concerned,9 has been attacked as lacking a cohesive foundation.10 The
very existence of the doctrine of equivalents has been challenged
before the United States Supreme Court" and despite being upheldl 2
5. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of
Claims-American Perspectives, 21 Int'l Rev. Indus. Prop. & Copyright L. 497, 499 (1990).
6. Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable?, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 231 (2005).
7. See id. at 233 (The Federal Circuit reversed the district courts' claim construction in
34.5 percent of the cases from 1996 through 2003.); see also Andrew T. Zidel, Comment, Patent
Claim Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study Showing the Need for Clear Guidance from the
Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REv. 711, 745-46 (2003) (reporting a 41.5 percent reversal
rate in 2001); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001) ("[T]he Federal Circuit reversed 29.6% of
cases involving an express review of claim construction.").
8. See William H. Burgess, Comment, Simplicity at the Cost of Clarity: Appellate
Review of
Claim Construction and the Failed Promise of Cybor, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 763, 763-64 (2004);
Moore, supra note 6, at 231 & n.2.
9. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997) ("Under
this doctrine [the doctrine of equivalents], a product or process that does not literally infringe
upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is
'equivalence' between the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements
of the patented invention.").
10. Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim
Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1948-49 (2005)
(footnotes omitted) ("Despite nearly two hundred years of development, patent law lacks a
coherent vision of a doctrine that holds great intuitive appeal. Debate about the proper contours
of the DOE is formal and unsatisfying because the doctrine lacks a strong normative
foundation.").
11. Warner-Jenkinson 520 U.S. at 26-27 & n.4.
12. Id. at 25. The United States Supreme Court unanimously rejected the "primary
argument" of the petitioners that the doctrine of equivalents should be abolished as inconsistent
with a number of revisions that were made to the patent statutes in the 1952 Patent Act. The
Supreme Court upheld the continuing viability of the doctrine of equivalents in the face of this
challenge. Id. at 25-26. The Supreme Court also rejected an argument that the doctrine of
equivalents should be abandoned on the basis that it was only applicable under so-called
"central claiming," a type of patent claims practice that claimed the "core principles" of an
invention and that has been replaced by "peripheral claiming" which describes the "outer
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is still questioned by some critics who would like to abolish it in its
current form'3 or limit its reach. 14 Prosecution history estoppel, a
doctrine that limits the application of the doctrine of equivalents,"
has been in a state of flux, creating uncertainty in its application.17
boundaries" of an invention. Id. at 27 n.4.
13. Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the Future
After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1157 (2004).
14. See, e.g., John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The Doctrine of Equivalents In
the Post-Markman Era, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 781, 783, 799-804 (2005)
(Thomas proposes, among other things, that judges be allowed to amend claims as a matter of
equity during patent infringement litigation and that equivalent infringers enjoy "intervening
rights commensurate with the reissue statute"); Matthew C. Phillips, Taking A Step Beyond
Maxwell To Tame the Doctrine of Equivalents, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
155, 168-86 (2000) (Phillips proposes that the doctrine of equivalents should be limited to
equivalents that arise after the filing of the original patent application, i.e. so-called "after-
arising technology," and should not include disclosed but unclaimed equivalents that are not
captured in a reissue proceeding); Scott P. Zimmerman, The Doctrine of Equivalents: A Call
For Congressional Reinvigoration, 40 IDEA 599 (2000) (Zimmerman proposes that Congress
should enact legislation setting obviousness as the test for the doctrine of equivalents); James K.
Folker, A Legislative Proposal To Clarify and Simplify Patent Infringement Analysis Under the
Doctrine of Equivalents, 6 FED, CIR. B.J. 211, 213 (1996) (Folker proposes legislation that
would both "limit application of the doctrine of equivalents to those equivalents, on an element-
by-element basis, which one of ordinary skill in the art would have known to be interchangeable
at the time of the alleged infringement" and "expand the period of availability for Continuation-
in-Part Applications such that they are available during the entire term of the patent.").
15. See, e.g., Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Prosecution history estoppel precludes a patentee from obtaining under the
doctrine of equivalents coverage of subject matter that has been relinquished during the
prosecution of its patent application.").
16. The relatively recent litigation in the Festo case, involving a prosecution history
estoppel issue, was ongoing for over ninenteen years and resulted in numerous opinions. The
most noteworthy of these opinions were an en bane decision of the Federal Circuit in 2000, a
decision of the Supreme Court in 2002, vacating the prior Federal Circuit decision, and a
subsequent en bane decision of the Federal Circuit in 2003. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F. 3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated 535 U.S. 722
(2002); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc).
Each of these three decisions announced new law in the area of prosecution history estoppel, as
discussed in Section III of this article.
17. In a concurring opinion in the Federal Circuit's 2003 en bane decision in Festo, Judge
Rader commented on the uncertainty created by the rapid changes in the law related to the
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en bane); see also John M. Benassi & Jessica R.
Wolf, Claim Construction and Proving Infringement: The Impact of Phillips, Festo and Their
Progeny, 948 P.L.I. 135, 142 (2008) (Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Festo, under
the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, while there is a presumption that a narrowing
amendment made for reasons substantially related to patentability will surrender equivalents of
the amended claim element, this presumption may be rebutted. The Supreme Court has
suggested "a potential test outlining effective rebuttal evidence." However, the authors point out
that "this test raises many new questions that litigators have been and will be grappling with for
years to come."); Erin Conway, Note, The Aftermath of Festo v. SMC: Is There "Some Other
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In addressing some of these problem areas in patent law,
commentators have raised a variety of global criticisms in attempts to
identify the root causes of some of these problems. There are those
who believe that the patent system is fatally flawed in that it generally
does not give appropriate economic incentives to achieve the
objectives of the constitutional mandate to "promote the Progress
of .. . useful Arts."' 8 Some critics believe that patent law needs to be
more subject matter specific regarding different areas of technology
in order to function effectively. 19 At least one critic believes that a
number of problem areas in patent law doctrine have arisen because
of flawed conventional wisdom that patents are grounded in an
exclusionary theory of property rights.20 Still others believe that more
weight needs to be put on certainty and the public notice aspects of
patent law in order to remedy many of the problem areas.2 1
This article presents the novel thesis that at least one important
root cause of a number of problems in patent law today lies in the
flawed analyses in a small number of relatively recent Seventh
Amendment 22 patent cases. In determining whether a judge or jury
should decide particular issues in these cases, the Federal Circuit 23
has placed too much emphasis on reaching outcomes perceived to be
beneficial from a policy perspective and too little emphasis on
performing analyses that conform to Supreme Court Seventh
Amendment precedent. This article explores the irony that in the
course of reaching Seventh Amendment outcomes perceived to foster
Reason" For Justifying the Third Festo Rebuttal Criterion?, 82 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1655 (2007)
(With respect to the third criterion suggested by the Supreme Court for rebutting a presumption
of the surrender of equivalents under the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, Conway
observes that "it is arguable that because the third criterion as it stands is so vague, patent
practitioners and patentees have been too confused to even utilize it.").
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19. See generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009).
20. Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
321 (2009).
21. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2.
22. The Seventh Amendment states in relevant part that "[i]n Suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VIL.
23. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, referred to herein as
simply "the Federal Circuit," is the specialized court established by Congress in 1982 to hear,
among other things, appeals in patent cases. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (relevant provisions codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.); see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. I (1989).
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certainty and uniformity in patent law, the Federal Circuit has
engaged in expedient and unprincipled analyses that include
statements and intermediate conclusions that have themselves
spawned multiple and widespread problems. Compounding these
problems, the Supreme Court has shown excessive deference to the
Federal Circuit in the area of Seventh Amendment issues, rarely
reviewing such decisionS24 despite showing an increased willingness
in recent years to review Federal Circuit decisions on many other
issues.25 As a result, the faulty reasoning in some of the Seventh
Amendment decisions of the Federal Circuit has spread like a virus
contaminating substantive theories of patent law, unchecked by
Supreme Court review.
This article will examine in detail two key decisions of the
Federal Circuit on Seventh Amendment issues that are flawed in their
analyses and inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. In order to
establish this latter point, the article will begin with an in-depth
review of the Seventh Amendment analysis in a landmark Supreme
Court case that addresses a Seventh Amendment issue related to
patent claim construction. This article will also address the manner in
which the two flawed decisions of the Federal Circuit have
contributed to the crises in three areas of substantive patent law:2 6
claim construction, the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution
24. The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
517 U.S. 370 (1996), discussed in Part I A herein, is its only major decision in the area of
Seventh Amendment rights in patent cases.
25. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kapos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010) (patentable subject matter); Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (patent exhaustion); KSR Int'l Co.
v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (obviousness); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S.
437 (2007) (applicability of 35 U.S.C. §271(f)); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S.
118 (2007) (patent licensee challenges to patent validity under the Declaratory Judgment Act);
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (standard for granting permanent
injunctive relief); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (antitrust law and
proof of market power in a tying arrangement involving a patented product).
26. Another area of patent law in which one of these two Seventh Amendment decisions
of the Federal Circuit has indirectly created problems is the standard of appellate review of
patent claim construction. This area of crisis in patent law was addressed in an earlier article in
which the Federal Circuit's intermediate conclusion that claim construction is purely an issue of
law, reached in dealing with the Seventh Amendment issue in Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 988 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996), was
shown to have infected the choice of a standard of appellate review for patent claim
construction. The de novo standard was subsequently reaffirmed in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs.,
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). See Eileen M. Herlihy, Appellate Review
of Patent Claim Construction: Should the Federal Circuit Be Its Own Lexicographer in Matters
Related to the Seventh Amendment?, 15 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 469 (2009),
available at http://www.mttlr.org/volfifteen/herlihy.pdf.
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history estoppel. In each of these areas of law relating to claim scope,
the ripple effect of the flawed Seventh Amendment analyses has had a
detrimental impact on the development of substantive law.
The thesis of this article is addressed in three parts. Part I of this
article begins with an examination of the Seventh Amendment
analysis of the Supreme Court in Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc.,27 in which the Court held that a judge, rather than a jury, should
decide issues of patent claim construction. Part I continues with a
detailed review of the manner in which the Federal Circuit's
underlying decision differed in its analysis from the Supreme Court
decision. Part I addresses the Federal Circuit's persistence in straying
from the Supreme Court's approach to Seventh Amendment issues,
and its persistence in applying a law versus fact analysis, consistently
stating that claim construction is purely an issue of law. Part I
concludes with a review of three areas of substantive law related to
claim construction that have suffered as a result: the proper use of
dictionaries in claim construction, the use of expert testimony and
evidence, and the role of one of ordinary skill in the art.
Part II of this article addresses the decision of the Federal Circuit
in Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.,2 8 in which the
court held that juries should decide issues of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents, again following a flawed analysis rooted in
the law versus fact distinction. Part II continues with a discussion of
the Supreme Court's failure to review the Seventh Amendment issue
at stake in that Federal Circuit decision, and the undue deference
displayed by the Supreme Court towards the Federal Circuit. Part II
concludes with a review of three problem areas in the substantive law
related to the doctrine of equivalents that have been created or
exacerbated as a result: the uncertain identity of the nature and
jurisprudential basis of the doctrine of equivalents, the extent to
which the doctrine of equivalents involves issues of both claim scope
and infringement, and the tension between claim scope under the
doctrine of equivalents and claim construction.
Part III of this article addresses the decisions of the Federal
Circuit and the Supreme Court in the Festo litigation,2 9 which include
a number of important decisions that rapidly and repeatedly altered
the substantive law of prosecution history estoppel. Part III continues
27. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
28. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
29. See supra note 16.
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with a discussion of the pressure faced by the Federal Circuit to
alleviate some of the tension that had been created by its Seventh
Amendment decisions in Markman and Hilton Davis. Part III
discusses the Federal Circuit's push to "remedy" the situation by
attempting to change the long standing rules for the application of the
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel in order to minimize the
availability of the doctrine of equivalents. Part III concludes with a
review of the enormous complexity that has been introduced into the
law of prosecution history estoppel as a result.
I. SEVENTH AMENDMENT DECISIONS AND THE LAW OF CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION
A. The Supreme Court's Seventh Amendment Decision in
Markman
The rights associated with any given patent are determined based
on the claims of the patent. 30 The claims of a patent are often said to
set forth the "metes and bounds" of these rights. 31 Therefore, the
issues surrounding the construction of patent claims are of utmost
importance. Judge Rich summed it up succinctly: .. . the name of the
game is the claim."32
Moreover, it is well established in patent law that claims are to
be interpreted based upon the understanding conveyed to one of
ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time of the invention by the
words and phrases used in the claims. Furthermore, it is well settled
that the words in the claims should be interpreted through the eyes of
one of skill in the art when read in light of the patent specification, all
of the claims, and the prosecution history.34 In theory, therefore, the
30. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1975).
31. CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 394 (2008).
32. Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims-American
Perspectives, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990), quoted in Hilton
Davis Chemical Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Plager, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
33. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1372-73
(Fed. Cir. 2005) ("When interpreting claims, we inquire into how a person of ordinary skill in
the art would have understood claim terms at the time of the invention." (quoting Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed.Cir.2005) (en banc))).
34. See, e.g., Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories,
476 F.3d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("A person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to have
read the claim term in the context of the entire patent, including the other claims, the
specification and the prosecution history." (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303
(Fed.Cir.2005) (en banc))); Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1224 (Fed.
Cir.1995) (Mayer, J., concurring) ("Claim interpretation demands an objective inquiry into how
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knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art should be
central to claim interpretation and claim scope. The claims of a
patent, as properly construed, should ideally serve as notice to those
of ordinary skill in the pertinent art as to the scope of the patent.3 5
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,36 the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether a jury should be involved in the
determination of the meaning of a patent claim. The issue in the case
focused on resolving conflicting testimony regarding a term of art in
the claim.37 The Supreme Court clearly identified at the outset of its
unanimous opinion that the issue at stake in the case involved a
determination of Seventh Amendment rights.
The question here is whether the interpretation of a so-called patent
claim, the portion of the patent document that defines the scope of
the patentee's rights, is a matter of law reserved entirely for the
court, or subject to a Seventh Amendment guarantee that a jury
will determine the meaning of any disputed term of art about
which expert testimony is offered.38
The Supreme Court immediately stated its ultimate holding on the
issue: "[w]e hold that the construction of a patent, including terms of
art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court."3 9
The Court then proceeded with an in-depth analysis to support the
holding under the Seventh Amendment.
In addressing the issue that it faced, the Supreme Court turned to
the traditional historical test" established in its Seventh Amendment
precedent.4 0
one of ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time of the invention would comprehend the
disputed word or phrase in view of the patent claims, specification, and prosecution history.").
The prosecution history of a patent is the written record of the proceedings associated with the
application for and allowance of a patent.
35. See, e.g., Nystrom v. TREX Co., Inc., 424 F.3d 1136, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
36. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). The Markman case
involved a question of claim construction of a business method patent related to a system for
tracking clothing in dry-cleaning businesses. Id. at 374. The meaning of the term "inventory"
within the patent claims was at issue. Id. at 375.
37. Id. at 372.
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 376. The Supreme Court in Markman attributed the "historical test" to the era of
Justice Story, citing United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C. Mass. 1812) (No.
16,750). The "historical test" has been continuously applied in Seventh Amendment analyses
since at least 1935, when the Supreme Court issued its decision in Baltimore & Carolina Line,
Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935). See generally Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must
Hear: The Supreme Court's Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 183, 187-98 (2000).
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[W]e ask, first, whether we are dealing with a cause of action that
either was tried at law at the time of the founding [when the
Seventh Amendment was adopted] or is at least analogous to one
that was. . . . If the action in question belongs in the law category,
we then ask whether the particular trial decision must fall to the
jury in order to preserve the substance of this common-law right as
it existed in 1791.41
Under the first part of the test, the Court looked to eighteenth century
42
actions that were tried at law, as opposed to equity or admiralty, in
the courts in England. The Court quickly concluded that "there is no
dispute that infringement cases today must be tried to a jury, as their
predecessors were more than two centuries ago." 4 3 The application of
the second part of the historical test, on the other hand, was far more
difficult for the Court.
In grappling with the second part of the historical test, the
question of "whether a particular issue occurring within a jury trial
(here the construction of a patent claim) is itself necessarily a jury
issue," the Court found that the historical evidence regarding the
eighteenth century English practice "provides no clear answer.""
Lacking the benefit of a "fool-proof test,"45 the Supreme Court had to
determine whether a jury must construe patent claims, and in
particular, disputed terms of art within the patent claims, in order "to
preserve the 'substance of the common-law right of trial by jury.'"
Noting that the standard is "a pretty blunt instrument for drawing
distinction," the Court pointed out that it had "tried to sharpen it, to be
sure, by reference to the distinction between substance and
procedure," and had "also spoken of the line as one between issues of
fact and law."4 7 However, it is extremely significant that the Court in
Markman did not choose the approach of trying to draw a line
between fact and law to determine whether any part of patent claim
construction must fall to the jury under the Seventh Amendment.
41. Markman, 517 U.S. at 376 (citation omitted).
42. The inquiry under the historical test is largely rooted in the historical distinction
between actions at law and actions in equity, with the right to a jury trial historically available
for actions at law but not for actions in equity. See generally James Fleming, Jr., Right to a Jury
Trial in Civil Actions, 72 Yale L.J. 655 (1963). The inquiry also involves distinguishing actions
at law from actions historically brought in admiralty. See, e.g., Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) (referring to the Seventh Amendment, the Supreme Court stated "[tihe
phrase 'common law,' found in this clause, is used in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty,
and maritime jurisprudence.").
43. Marknan, 517 U.S. at 377.
44. Id. (citations omitted).
45. Id.
46. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987)).
47. Id. at 378.
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Rather, labeling claim construction a "mongrel practice," in
immediate juxtaposition to the fact versus law reference, the Court
chose a nested historical approach:
But the sounder course, when available, is to classify a mongrel
practice (like construing a term of art following receipt of
evidence) by using the historical method, much as we do in
characterizing the suits and actions within which they arise. Where
there is no exact antecedent, the best hope lies in comparing the
modem practice to earlier ones whose allocation to court or jury
we do know. 48
The Court, however, decided that this approach also failed to resolve
the issue. The Court found no evidence of patent claims prior to 1790
in either English patent law or the practices in American states, and
therefore "no direct antecedent of modem claim construction in the
historical sources." 49 The Court found some early cases that involved
the construction of patent specifications and determined that the issue
of construing a patent specification was the closest analogy to patent
claim construction at the time relevant to the Seventh Amendment
analysis. 50 However, the Court concluded that none of the cases
established that construction of disputed terms in patent specifications
was an issue for the jury.5'
Unable to resolve the issue of whether a jury must construe
terms of art in a patent claim based upon the evidence of common law
practice at the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted, the Court
turned for guidance to existing precedent, and considered the "relative
interpretative skills of judges and juries," and statutory policies.52
Reviewing both case precedent and treatises, the Court concluded that
these authorities did not indicate that juries had been involved in
construing terms of art in patents, but instead supported delegating the
task of claim construction to the court.53
48. Id. (emphasis added). Since the term "mongrel practice" in the opinion followed
immediately after the statement "[w]e have also spoken of the line as one between issues of fact
and law," it appears clear that the court intended the term "mongrel practice" to refer to a mixed
question of fact and law.
49. Id. at 378-79.
50. Id at 379-80.
51. Id. at 379-84. The Supreme Court refused to imply that juries must have construed
claims in reaching documented verdicts, finding it more likely that the judge interpreted the
patent documents. Id. at 381-82 ("There is no more reason to infer that juries supplied plenary
interpretation of written instruments in patent litigation than in other cases implicating the
meaning of documentary terms, and we do know that in other kinds of cases during this period
judges, not juries, ordinarily construed written documents.").
52. Id. at 384.
53. Id. at 384-88.
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The Court considered whether "functional considerations"
weighed in favor of having a judge, rather than a jury, define terms of
art within the patent claims, stating:
[W]hen an issue 'falls somewhere between a pristine legal
standard and a simple historicalfact, the fact/law distinction at
times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound
administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than
another to decide the issue in question.,54
The Court concluded that judges are likely to be better at construing
patent claims than jurors, on the basis that judges frequently construe
written instruments, have special training and are therefore more
likely to reach "a proper interpretation."5 5 The Court dismissed the
argument that the jury should be involved in claim construction to
evaluate witness credibility when testimony is offered as to the
meaning of a term of art "peculiar to a trade or profession,"
concluding that these determinations would be "subsumed" within the
judge's interpretation of the entire document.56 The Court
acknowledged that cases could arise in which a credibility judgment
concerning conflicting expert testimony would be the determining
factor in construing a term of art but expressed doubt that many patent
cases would turn on such credibility judgments. The Court
concluded that "despite its evidentiary underpinnings," the
construction of terms of art within a claim should be left to the judge
who has the overall task of construing the patent.
In the final portion of its decision, the Court addressed the
importance of providing "uniformity" in the treatment of patents, a
policy issue that the Court stated provides an "independent reason to
allocate all issues of construction to the court."5 9 Linking the policy
of uniformity to certainty, the Court stated that the limits of patent
54. Id. at 388-90 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (emphasis added)).
55. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-89 (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 7 West.L.J. 417, 18 F. Cas.
1138, 1140 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (No. 10,740)).
56. Markman, 517 U.S. at 389 ("In the main, we expect any credibility determinations
will be subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document, required
by the standard construction rule that a term can be defined only in a way that comports with the
instrument as a whole.").
57. Id. at 389.
58. Id. at 389-90 (emphasis added) (Comparing the jury's virtues to the training and
ability ofjudges, the Supreme Court in Markman stated that a jury's "capabilities to evaluate
demeanor," "to sense the 'mainsprings of human conduct"' (quoting Comm'r of Internal
Revenue v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960)) and "to reflect community standards" are
"much less significant" in the instance of construing terms of art within a patent claim than a
judge's "trained ability to evaluate the testimony in relation to the overall structure of the
patent" in order to "preserve the patent's internal coherence.").
59. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.
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protection need to be known in order to protect patentees, to prevent
others from being discouraged to invent due to uncertainty regarding
infringement, and to ensure that the public will ultimately get the
proper benefit of patents. 60 The Supreme Court also referenced the
desire of Congress to support uniformity in patent law, and thereby
encourage innovation, by creating the Federal Circuit.6' Applying
these policy goals, the Court stated that uniformity would be "ill
served by submitting issues of document construction to juries," even
though the Court acknowledged that issue preclusion would apply to
prevent evidentiary questions from being retried in every new patent
case. 6 2 In the penultimate paragraph, the Court stated that stare decisis
would provide a better route to attempt to foster uniformity in claim
construction, reasoning that "treating interpretive issues as purely
legal will promote (though it will not guarantee) intrajurisdictional
certainty through the application of stare decisis on those questions
not yet subject to inter-jurisdictional uniformity under the authority of
the single appeals court."63
In its Markman decision, the Supreme Court repeatedly
acknowledged the factual underpinnings of claim construction in the
course of its analysis leading to the holding that there is no Seventh
Amendment right to have a jury evaluate evidence related to "terms
of art" in patent claims. The Court unequivocally labeled claim
construction a "mongrel practice," in immediate juxtaposition to a
fact versus law reference.64 The Court acknowledged that the
construction of terms of art within a claim is an issue that "falls
somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical
fact,"6s and has "evidentiary underpinnings."66 While the language
regarding uniformity and stare decisis has created internal tension
within the Court's opinion, it is part of a policy consideration cited as
an "independent reason" to allocate claim construction issues to a
judge rather than a jury. 67 It should not be viewed as negating any of
the statements made by the Court in its Seventh Amendment
60. Id. (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938);
United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942), and Merrill v. Yeomans,
94 U.S. 568, 573 (1877)).
61. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.
62. Id. at 391.
63. Id. (first emphasis added). The Court favored stare decisis because issue preclusion
does not apply to "new and independent infringement defendants even within a given
jurisdiction." Id.
64. Marknan, 517 U.S. at 378 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 388 (emphasis added) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
66. Marknan, 517 U.S. at 389-90 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 390.
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analysis .
It is important to note that while the Court considered factors
beyond those falling within the traditional historical test, the Court
expressly stated that its Seventh Amendment decision was not based
on the application of a fact versus law test:
Because we conclude that our precedent supports classifying the
question as one for the court, we need not decide either the extent
to which the Seventh Amendment can be said to have crystallized a
law/fact distinction, or whether post-1791 precedent classifying an
issue as one of fact would trigger the protections of the Seventh
Amendment if (unlike this case) there were no more specific
reason for decision. 69
This position has not been accepted by the Federal Circuit.
B. The Federal Circuit's Perpetuation of Claim Construction as
Purely an Issue ofLaw
While the Supreme Court in its Markman decision clearly and
unanimously framed the issue of whether there should be jury
involvement in the construction of patent claims as one that required
the application of the Seventh Amendment and triggered the historical
test rather than a fact versus law approach, the majority of the Federal
Circuit had not taken that path in its earlier decision below. Rather, in
its en banc decision in Markmna, 7 0 which was the subject of the
Supreme Court's review, the majority of the Federal Circuit had
expressly embraced a fact versus law approach in concluding that
"the interpretation and construction of the patent claims . . . is a
matter of law exclusively for the court." 7' The majority of the Federal
68. The stare decisis language in the Supreme Court's decision has led to confusion and
tension, and I believe it should be revisited and clarified. In any event, since the Supreme Court
used the word "treating" in the phrase "treating interpretive issues as purely legal," I believe the
Court was discussing a policy position that it knew to be a legal fiction. Id. at 391.
69. Id. at 384 n. 10 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
70. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). In the Federal Circuit's subsequent Cybor decision, the majority
labels its own Markman en banc decision as Markman 1, while referring to the Supreme Court's
Markman
decision as Markman II. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451-54 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (en banc). The author of this article declines to use the commonly applied labels
Marknan land Markman II because the labels appear to imply a parity between the authority of
the Federal Circuit and the United States Supreme Court which is, of course, misleading.
71. Markman, 52 F.3d at 970-71. The majority opinion was written by Chief Judge
Archer, and joined by Judges Rich, Nies, Michel, Plager, Lourie, Clevenger, and Schall. Judges
Mayer and Rader filed opinions concurring in the judgment but not adopting the majority
position that claim construction "is a matter of law exclusively for the court." See id. at 989-99.
Judge Mayer denounced the treatment of the Seventh Amendment by the majority (id. at 989-
90, 992), and Judge Rader strongly criticized the majority for reaching the issue of "[w]hether
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Circuit framed the issue below as follows: "we must distinguish law
from fact."7 2 By approaching the issue in this manner, the majority of
the Federal Circuit engaged in what amounted to an end-run-around
the Seventh Amendment, defining away any factual underpinnings
that would trigger a rigorous Seventh Amendment analysis.
The obstacle that the majority of the Federal Circuit faced in its
analysis was its own precedent.73 The majority acknowledged that
"[t]he opinions of this court have contained some inconsistent
statements as to whether and to what extent claim construction is a
legal or factual issue, or a mixed issue."74 Moreover, the majority
acknowledged that it had previously stated or held in a significant
number of its earlier opinions that "there may be jury triable fact
issues in claim construction."75 Nevertheless, the majority decided
that the earliest of these opinions was lacking in "authoritative
support,"76 and that the cases that followed in this line provided "no
claim construction can involve subsidiary facts" (id. at 998), on the basis that the issue was not
properly before the court. Judge Newman dissented on the basis of the majority's failure to
properly apply the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 999-1026.
72. Id. at 976 (emphasis added).
73. The Markman case had originally been tried to a jury that was instructed as part of its
charge to "determine the meaning of the claims." Id. at 973 (quoting excerpts from the jury
instructions). Following a jury verdict of infringement of some of the claims at issue in response
to general interrogatories, the trial judge had granted a motion for judgment as a matter of law
(JMOL) for the defendants, stating that claim construction is a matter of law for the court. Id.
The patent owner appealed on the grounds that it was not only proper for the jury to interpret the
patent claims, it was required under Federal Circuit precedent. Id. at 973-74. The patent owner,
Markman, cited Polumbo v. Don - Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985) for the
proposition that a dispute over the meaning of a term in a patent claim presents a factual
question. Markman, 52 F.3d at 973-974. Markman also cited Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma
Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1550-52 (Fed. Cir. 1991) for the
proposition that a jury's claim construction should be given deference. Markman, 52 F.3d at
974.
74. Markman, 52 F.3d at 976.
75. Id. at 977. The majority of the Federal Circuit discussed "a significant line of cases
[that] has developed in our precedent" that it had to resolve. Id The majority specifically
referred to the following cases decided between 1984 and 1997: McGill Inc. v. John Zink Co.,
736 F.2d 666, 672 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Bio-Rad Labs, Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d
604, 614 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc. 794 F.2d 653, 657 (Fed. Cir. 1986); H.H. Robertson Co. v. United Steel
Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1987); and Perini America, Inc. v. Paper Converting
Machine Co., 832 F.2d 581, 584 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Markman, 52 F.3d at 977. The court also
indicated that "[tihe language from these opinions, to the effect that disputes over the meaning
of claim language may raise factual questions reviewed for substantial evidence or clear error, as
the case may be, continued to propagate through our precedent," culminating in Tol-O-Matic,
Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Markman, 52 F.3d at 977.
76. Markman, 52 F.3d at 977. The Federal Circuit Markman majority stated that McGill
Inc. v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666 (Fed. Cir. 1984) was the first Federal Circuit case to state
that "claim construction may have underlying factual inquiries that must be submitted to a jury."
Markman, 52 F.3d at 976. The Federal Circuit Markman majority took the position, however,
that the McGill case mistakenly relied upon a case for that proposition when the case cited
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firmer basis for the view."" These positions were vigorously refuted
in one concurring opinion78 and a dissenting opinion.79 Further, the
majority proclaimed that the first Federal Circuit opinion that dealt
with an issue of claim construction explicitly stated that claim
construction was a matter of law,80 and that another line of its
precedent continued to adhere to the view that "claim construction is
strictly a question of law for the court."
These positions of the majority were also challenged. In a
concurring opinion, one judge questioned the existence of such a line
82
of cases, rejecting the majority's interpretation of the case law. In a
dissenting opinion, another judge discussed her view that statements
that claim construction present an issue of law are not in any way
incompatible with the existence of underlying questions of fact.83
actually stood for the opposite position. Markman, 52 F.3d at 976 (discussing Envirotech Corp.
v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
77. Markman, 52 F.3d at 977.
78. Markman, 52 F.3d at 989-90 (Mayer, C.J., concurring). Judge Mayer reviewed and
discussed Federal Circuit precedent (id. at 989-90), emphatically rejecting the majority's
"revisionist reading of precedent to loose claim interpretation from its factual foundations." Id.
at 990. Judge Mayer concluded that the majority's pronouncements on Federal Circuit precedent
represented a reversal of position. "Contrary to what it says today, this court (including the
judges in the majority) has always held that claim interpretation is a matter of law depending on
underlying factual inquiries." Id. at 989 (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 999-1000, 1017-21 (Newman, J. dissenting). Judge Newman sharply criticized
the majority's "new rule" (id. at 1000) that claim construction is a matter of law solely for the
court. Judge Newman pointed out that "[h]eretofore, the disputed meaning of technologic terms
and words of art has been treated by Federal Circuit precedent as an 'underlying fact' on which
the legal effect of the patent is based." Id. at 999. Judge Newman further stated that the
"meaning and scope of the technologic terms and words of art used to define patented
inventions" are frequently in dispute and that the resolution of such disputes involves "the
weight, credibility, and probative value of conflicting evidence." Id. While agreeing with the
majority that the construction of patent claims is a matter of law, Judge Newman rejected the
majority's position that there are no underlying facts in claim construction. Id. at 1000 ("The
legal effect of the patent claim is to establish the metes and bounds of the patent right to
exclude; this is a matter of law. But this does not deprive the underlying facts of their nature as
fact.").
80. Id. at 976 (citing SSIH Equip. S.A. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d
365, 376 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (originally reported at 713 F.2d 746-60)).
81. Id. at 977.
82. Markman, 52 F.3d at 990 n.2 (Mayer, C.J., concurring). Judge Mayer strongly
criticized the majority. He stated that while the majority "pretends" there is a separate line of
Federal Circuit cases holding that claim construction is strictly a matter of law for the court,
never involving any underlying facts for a jury, the cases cited by the majority do not support its
contention. Judge Mayer pointed out that most of the cases cited by the majority were bench
trials, "a puzzling source for guidance on the commands of the Seventh Amendment." Id
Further, Judge Mayer stated that other cases cited by the majority involved factual disputes
"inadequate" to support a jury verdict.
83. Markman, 52 F.3d at 1000 (Newman, J. dissenting). While agreeing with the majority
that the construction of patent claims is a matter of law, Judge Newman rejected the majority's
position that there are no underlying facts in claim construction. "The legal effect of the patent
claim is to establish the metes and bounds of the patent right to exclude; this is a matter of law.
But this does not deprive the underlying facts of their nature as fact." Id.
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After criticizing the significant number of Federal Circuit cases
that had stated or held that there might be "jury triable fact issues"
involved in claim construction, the majority turned to Supreme Court
precedent. The majority stated that "the Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that the construction of a patent claim is a matter of law
exclusively for the court," citing, without quotation or analysis,
Supreme Court cases from 1848 through 1904. 84 This interpretation
of precedent was again vigorously rejected by two Federal Circuit
judges in one concurring opinion and a dissenting opinion.86
As support for its reading of precedent, the majority stated that
courts should construe patent claims as a matter of law and should not
delegate the task to a jury as a matter of fact because "[i]t has long
been and continues to be a fundamental principle of American law
that 'the construction of a written evidence is exclusively with the
court.'" 8
The majority stated that since "[t]he patent is a fully integrated
written instrument," it is "uniquely suited for having its meaning and
scope determined entirely by a court as a matter of law," under this
general rule.8 8
According to the majority, policy considerations also support
this rule. The majority pronounced that there is "much wisdom" in
having the court construe patent claims since the construction defines
"the federal legal rights created by the patent document."89 Moreover,
the majority discussed both issues of fair notice to competitors and
the confidence needed by all parties that a judge "trained in the law"
would apply "established rules of construction" to arrive at "the true
and consistent scope of the patent owner's rights." 90
84. Id. at 977-78.
85. Id at 993-96 (Mayer, C.J., concurring). Judge Mayer carefully discussed Supreme
Court precedent, concluding that the opinions of the highest court supported a jury role in
deciding any "real factual dispute" (id. at 994) that might be raised by extrinsic evidence in
claim construction. Id. at 993-96.
86. Id. at 1002, 1021-25 (Newman, J. dissenting) ("The authority on which the majority
relies simply does not support its statement that 'the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
construction of a patent claim is a matter of law exclusively for the court."' Id. at 1021 (quoting
Majority opinion at 994)).
87. Markman, 52 F.3d at 978 (quoting Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. 180, 185 (1805) (Marshall,
C.J.)).
88. Id. at 978.
89. Id.
90. Id at 978-79.
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Based on its analysis, the Federal Circuit majority announced its
holding:
We therefore settle inconsistencies in our precedent and hold that
in a case tried to a jury, the court has the power and obligation to
construe as a matter of law the meaning of language used in the
patent claim . . .. Because claim construction is a matter of law,
the construction given the claims is reviewed de novo on appeal.9 1
It is striking that in the analysis leading up to this holding, the
majority opinion does not apply, discuss, or even mention the Seventh
Amendment. 9 2 There is no application of the historical approach in
the analysis. The majority opinion only briefly discusses the Seventh
Amendment after reaching its holding.9 3 The majority does so as
rebuttal 94  to the Seventh Amendment positions asserted in the
dissenting95 and one of the concurring opinions 9 6 in the case. In its
rebuttal, the majority acknowledged that under the Seventh
Amendment, the right to a jury trial exists if an action "could be tried
to a jury in 1791," or if it is a statutory cause of action "analogous to
common law actions."97 However, the majority stated that its holding
"do[es] not deprive parties of their right to a jury trial in patent
infringement cases," but "merely holds that part of the infringement
91. Id. at 979.
92. See id. at 970-79.
93. Id. at 984.
94. Id ("Yet the dissenting and one of the concurring opinions assert that our decision
violates the Seventh Amendment. A close analysis of the bases underlying their arguments
reveals, however, that they are unsupported by logic and precedent.").
95. Id. at 1000, 1010-17 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman reserved her strongest
criticism of the majority's analysis and holding that claim construction is purely an issue of law
with no underlying facts for its failure to take the Seventh Amendment into account.
Jury trial in patent cases is protected by the Seventh Amendment. Elimination of
the jury is not this Court's choice to make.
The constitutional right alone bars the majority's new rule. The majority today
denies 200 years of jury trial of patent cases in the United States, preceded by
over 150 years of jury trail of patent cases in England, by simply calling a
question of fact a question of law. The Seventh Amendment is not so readily
circumvented.
Id at 1000 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 989-98 (Mayer, C.J., concurring). Judge Mayer wrote an opinion which
concurred in the judgment but which empathetically rejected and vehemently criticized the
majority's holding that claim construction is a matter of law solely for the court. Judge Mayer
warned that the majority opinion "jettisons more than two hundred years ofjurisprudence and
eviscerates the role of the jury preserved by the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States." Id. at 989. Reviewing and discussing Federal Circuit precedent (id. at 989-90),
Judge Mayer denounced the majority's reversal of position on Seventh Amendment grounds. Id
at 990 (footnote omitted) ("So it is remarkable that the court so casually changes its collective
mind, especially when the just cited precedent [by Judge Mayer] was compelled by the Seventh
Amendment and not the mere preference of a sufficient number ofjudges.").
97. Id. at 984 (majority opinion).
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inquiry, construing and determining the scope of the claims in a
patent, is strictly a legal question for the court." 98
The Federal Circuit majority opinion in Markman, as previously
stated, amounted to an end-run-around the Seventh Amendment. The
majority of the Federal Circuit achieved this goal by denying that
there were any issues of fact involved in claim construction. The
majority took this position despite a significant number of contrary
statements and holdings in its own prior decisions. It did so in order to
avoid framing the issue of whether a jury should be involved in patent
claim construction as one governed by an in-depth Seventh
Amendment analysis. More importantly, it did so as a matter of
expediency in order to reach the outcome it perceived to foster
certainty and uniformity.
It is important to emphasize that the Federal Circuit's Markman
decision represented a major change in patent law up to that point in
time. Not only did the Federal Circuit contradict, and in some
instances overrule, cases in a "significant line" 99 of its own precedent,
but it also took a different approach to analyzing issues of jury
involvement in patent cases than it had in the past. The Federal
Circuit had not always dodged Seventh Amendment issues. The
analysis employed by the majority in the en banc Markman decision
of the Federal Circuit differed dramatically from an earlier Federal
Circuit panel decision in In re Lockwood.100
In the Lockwood case, on a motion for rehearing, a panel of the
Federal Circuit faced the issue of whether the defendant in a patent
infringement suit had a right to a jury trial on its counterclaim for a
declaratory judgment that the patent in suit was invalid.1 o' The panel
had issued a writ of mandamus directing the district court to reinstate
the jury demand on the counterclaim which the judge below had
stricken.10 2  On rehearing, the panel addressed the Seventh
Amendment issue, employing the traditional historical analysis set
forth in Supreme Court precedent in order to determine whether the
statutory cause of action for a declaratory judgment, as it relates to
patent invalidity, should be considered analogous to causes of action
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 999 (Newman, J., Dissenting).
100. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., American Airlines
Inc. v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1121 (1995), and subsequently dismissed as moot, 515 U.S. 1182
(1995).
101. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 968-69.
102. Id. at 969. The Lockwood panel on rehearing consisted of Judges Michel, Bennett,
and Lourie. Id. at 968. A motion for a rehearing en bane was denied. Id. at 980.
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heard at law, in equity, or in admiralty in England in 1791.103 In the
course of its analysis, the panel considered whether the Seventh
Amendment guarantees were inapplicable under a "public rights"
analysis: "[t]he Court has cautioned that the Seventh Amendment
does not automatically entitle a party to a jury trial if Congress can
and has assigned adjudication of the legal claim concerning such
public right exclusively to an administrative agency." 0 4 The panel
quickly dismissed this possibility, stating that "assuming arguendo
that patents confer purely public rights, litigation concerning those
patent rights in Article III courts comes within the protection provided
by the Seventh Amendment." 0 5 Applying the historical analysis, the
panel granted the writ of mandamus on rehearing, holding that there is
a Seventh Amendment right to have factual questions relating to
validity tried to a jury in a declaratory judgment counterclaim.10 6
It should be noted that the Lockwood panel decision struck a
nerve. While the Federal Circuit denied a motion for rehearing en
banc, 07 Judge Nies authored an opinion dissenting from this later
decision. 08  In it, Judge Nies stated: "No more important nor
contentious an issue arises in patent law jurisprudence than the
appropriate role of juries in patent litigation." 09
Admittedly, in the Lockwood case the Federal Circuit did not
have the authority to avoid the Seventh Amendment issue by
declaring that there are no factual issues involved in patent validity
questions that include challenges of obviousness. While the majority
of the Federal Circuit in its en banc Markman decision applied a
rationale that claim construction is purely an issue of law, devoid of
any possible factual component, in evading a Seventh Amendment
historical approach,"o the Federal Circuit was bound by Supreme
103. Id. at 971-76.
104. Id at 972 n.5.
105. Id In a decision dissenting from an order denying rehearing en banc, Judge Nies,
joined by Chief Judge Archer and Judge Plager, disagreed with the panel's public rights analysis
stating that "[t]he validity of a patent involves public rights not private rights" and "[n]o Seventh
Amendment jury rights adhere to a determination of public rights." Id. at 981 (Nies, J., joined by
Archer, C. J. and Plager, J., dissenting from the order denying rehearing en banc).
106. Id. at 976, 980. The panel of the Federal Circuit vacated its prior order granting
mandamus, which it stated contained erroneous statements (id. at 969), and granted mandamus
on the basis of the analysis contained in the rehearing decision (id. at 969, 980).
107. Id. at 980.
108. Id. at 980-90 (Nies, J., joined by Archer, C. J. and Plager, J., dissenting from the order
denying rehearing en banc).
109. Id. at 980. In the dissent, Judge Nies noted that while he did not question the
existence of a jury trial right in patent infringement suits seeking damages, "saying such an
overall right exists tells us nothing about which issues must be decided by a jury upon demand
of a litigant and which issues are for the judge to decide." Id at 981 (emphasis in original).
110. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976-88 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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Court precedent at the time of its Lockwood decision that explicitly
recognized underlying factual inquiries in determining
obviousness."' Therefore, in Lockwood the Federal Circuit could not
take the path chosen by the majority in its subsequent Markman
decision.
It is of critical significance, however, that even after the Supreme
Court issued its opinion in the Markman case,112 the Federal Circuit
persisted in its position that claim construction is purely an issue of
law, devoid of any factual component, based upon the Federal
Circuit's own majority analysis in its Markman decision." 3 While the
position of the majority of the Federal Circuit in its Markman
decision represented a major change in Federal Circuit law at the
time, it is the Federal Circuit's subsequent persistence in relying upon
a law versus fact analysis, which was specifically rejected by the
Supreme Court in its Markman analysis,' '4 that is stunning.
After the Supreme Court issued its decision in the Markman
case, a majority of the Federal Circuit judges stated in an en banc
decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc."' that the
construction of patent claims is "a purely legal issue," and is therefore
subject to de novo review on appeal.1 6 The Federal Circuit's majority
holding in Cybor with respect to the standard of appellate review of
patent claim construction, an issue not addressed by the Supreme
Court in its Markman decision, was based upon the Federal Circuit's
own majority opinion in Markman,"7 and reaffirmed the Federal
Circuit's prior position." 8 It did not follow from the Seventh
Amendment analysis employed by the Supreme Court in its Markman
decision. It followed from the law versus fact approach taken by the
majority of the Federal Circuit in its Markman decision, an approach
which the Supreme Court expressly refused to apply in its Markman
analysis. Nevertheless, the majority of the Federal Circuit in the en
banc decision in the Cybor case proclaimed that its de novo standard
of review was supported by the Supreme Court's Markman
111. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 971 n.4 (citing the Supreme Court's decision in Graham
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) for the proposition that there are factual inquiries
underlying the ultimate legal question of whether a patent is invalid for obviousness under 35
U.S.C. § 103).
112. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
113. Markman, 52 F.3d 967.
114. Markman, 517 U.S. at 384 n.10.
115. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
116. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d at 1451, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
117. Id. at 145 1(citing Markman, 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
118. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979.
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decision." 9
The Federal Circuit majority in Cybor stated that the Supreme
Court, in its Markman decision, addressed the issue of "under which
category, fact or law, claim construction should fall."l 20 The Federal
Circuit Cybor majority pronounced that "[n]othing in the Supreme
Court's [Markman] opinion supports the view that the Court endorsed
a silent, third option-that claim construction may involve subsidiary
or underlying questions of fact,"' 2 1 and that the Markman decision of
the Supreme Court "conclusively and repeatedly states that claim
construction is purely legal."l 2 2 This later position of the majority of
the Federal Circuit in characterizing the Supreme Court's Markman
opinion was vehemently opposed and criticized by other judges of the
Federal Circuit.12 3  However, despite continuing criticism from
numerous judges on the Federal Circuit,12 4 and other members of the
bench and the bar,125 the Federal Circuit has continued to apply the de
119. Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1451.
120. Id at 1455.
121. Id. (footnote omitted).
122. Id at 1456.
123. Id at 1463-72 (Mayer, C.J., joined by Newman, J., concurring in judgment but
disagreeing with opinion) (Stating that the Federal Circuit's majority opinion in Cybor
"profoundly misapprehends" the Supreme Court's Markman decision (id. at 1463), Judge Mayer
stated that the Supreme Court did not adopt the Federal Circuit's reasoning in Markman:
"Though it could have done so easily, the [Supreme] Court chose not to accept our formulation
of claim construction: as a pure question of law to be decided de novo in all cases on appeal."
Id at 1464 (footnote omitted)); id at 1473-78 (Rader, J., dissenting from the "pronouncements
on claim interpretation in the en banc opinion," concurring in the judgment, and joining part IV
of the opinion) (Judge Rader stated that "the Supreme Court repeatedly intimated [in its
Markman decision] that claim construction was not a purely legal matter." Id. at 1473 (emphasis
added); Id. at 1478-81 (Newman, J., joined by Mayer, C.J., filing "additional views" critical of
the de novo standard of review) (Judge Newman observed that while the Federal Circuit took
the position in Markman that "in patent cases, unlike any other area of law, a disputed question
of the meaning, scope and usage of terms of technologic art is not a question of fact, or even of
law based on underlying fact, but is pure law," the Supreme Court in its Markman decision
"relieved us of adherence to this fiction, by its recognition of the factual component of claim
interpretation." Id. at 1480).
124. See, e.g, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330-35 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(Mayer, J., joined by Newman, J., dissenting) (In Judge Mayer's dissent, he severely criticized
the de novo standard of review, stating in part "[n]ow more than ever I am convinced of the
futility, indeed the absurdity, of this
court's persistence in adhering to the falsehood that claim construction is a matter of law devoid
of any factual component." Id. at 1330.); see also Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,
469 F.3d 1039, 1040-41(Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michel, C.J., dissenting, joined by Rader, J.); id at
1043 (Newman, J., dissenting); id at 1044-45 (Rader, J., dissenting); id. at 1046 (Moore, J.,
dissenting).
125. See, e.g., Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Neither Party at 17-21, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303, No. 03-1269; Brief for Federal Circuit Bar
Association as Amicus Curiae at 7-9, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303, No. 03-1269; Cheryl Lee
Johnson, The False Premise and Promises of Markman's Decision to Task Judges with Claim
Construction and the Judicial Scorecard, 837 PLl/PAT 9, 67 (2005); Kathleen M. O'Malley,
Patti Saris & Ronald H. Whyte, A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective
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novo standard of review of patent claim construction based upon the
Federal Circuit's own law versus fact analysis in its Markman
decision.
It appears that the Federal Circuit has continued to follow its
own analysis in the application of the Seventh Amendment in patent
claim construction cases, rather than that of the Supreme Court, for
reasons of expediency. In the area of claim construction, the Federal
Circuit placed a premium on certainty and uniformity in its Markman
analysis. 126
While the Supreme Court did not employ the law versus fact
analysis utilized by the Federal Circuit in the latter's Markman
analysis, the Supreme Court did endorse the goal of uniformity in the
area of claim construction. 127 In fact, the trend towards enforcing
certainty and uniformity in patent law has been the subject of much
attention and has been referred to as creating a "cultural push within
patent circles."1 2 8 The Federal Circuit has apparently decided that by
foregoing a principled and rigorous analysis under the Seventh
Amendment, it can place the construction of patent claims under its
control. By treating claim construction as purely an issue of law
without any associated questions of fact, the Federal Circuit not only
eliminated the jury, a "brilliant idea" in the words of a Federal Circuit
judge,129 but also guaranteed itself a de novo review of the lower
court's claim construction. Federal Circuit Judge Mayer issued a
warning in his separate opinion in the Markman case,' 30 about the
of the District Judge, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 671, 679 (2004) (Judge Saris voiced the opinion
that there should be more deference to the trial judge in claim construction).
126. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978-79 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In the
Federal Circuit's Markman decision, the majority notes that competitors need to "be able to
ascertain to a reasonable degree the scope of the patentee's right to exclude," (id at 978) and
that patentees are protected by arriving at a "true and consistent scope of the claims." (id. at
979).
127. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390-91 (1996).
128. Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law ofPatents, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 51,
84(2010).
129. In a keynote address, Judge Plager, who was one of the majority in the Federal
Circuit's en banc decision in Markman, referred to the expedient outcome sought by the Federal
Circuit in dealing with the issue of claim construction: "So in the Markman case we came up
with the brilliant idea of taking claim construction from the jury and giving it to the trial judges,
whose articulated understandings we would then be able to review." Hon. S. Jay Plager,
Keynote Address at the University of North Carolina School of Law Symposium on Frontiers of
Empirical Patent Law Scholarship, (Oct. 24, 2008), available at
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/announcements/2008/JudgePlagerSpeechl0.24.200
8.pdf (cited in Harold C. Wegner, Note, Claim Construction: A Federal Circuit Judge Provides
Useful Insights (2008)). Judge Plager went on to acknowledge problems with high claim
construction reversal rates on appeal. Id.
130. Markman, 52 F.3d at 989-98 (Mayer, C.J., concurring in the judgment but criticizing
the majority holding that claim construction is a matter of law exclusively for the court).
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Federal Circuit's "hellbent" campaign, despite precedent, 131 to
eliminate the jury from patent cases, and the court's "quest to free
patent litigation from the 'unpredictability' of jury verdicts, and
generalist judges."l 32 Judge Mayer predicted that the course set by the
Federal Circuit "portends turbulence and cynicism in patent
litigation." 3 3
Since the Supreme Court issued its Markman decision, the
Federal Circuit has expressly and repeatedly stated the position that
claim construction should be considered purely an issue of law
without any factual component in the context of supporting a de novo
standard of appellate review of claim construction. 13 4 The standard of
appellate review of claim construction is an issue generally regarded
as one of procedure. However, the ripple effect of the position
repeatedly endorsed by the Federal Circuit, that claim construction is
purely an issue of law, has also invaded the Federal Circuit's
treatment of substantive law in general in the area of claim
construction.
C. Confusion in the Substantive Law of Claim Construction
Resulting from the Federal Circuit's Flawed Approach to
Seventh Amendment Issues
"Contrariwise," continued Tweedledee,
"if it was so, it might be;
and if it were so, it would be;
but as it isn't, it ain't."
- Alice Through the Looking Glass, Lewis Carroll, Chapter 4
131. Id. at 990 n.2.
132. Id. at 989.
133. Id
134. See, e.g., Solvay S.A. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 622 F.3d 1367, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamar Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 1305, 1314 (Fed. Cir.
2010); Ring Plus, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless Corp., 614 F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010), reh'g
andreh'g en banc denied (Oct. 7, 2010); Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Communications, Inc., 614
F.3d 1333, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010), reh'g andreh'g en banc denied (Oct. 8, 2010). See also
Herlihy, supra note 26, at 474-75, 507 ("While there is growing support among the judges on
the Federal Circuit to reconsider the de novo standard of appellate review set forth in the Cybor
case, which is grounded in the Federal Circuit's own analysis in its Markman decision, the
Federal Circuit has continued to adhere to Cybor, and the Supreme Court has denied a number
of petitions for certiorari on the issue of the standard of appellate review for patent claim
construction.").
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A great deal of "mischief" 35 has resulted from the Federal
Circuit's convenient fiction, originally adopted to circumvent the
Seventh Amendment, that claim construction is purely an issue of law
without any factual underpinnings.
1. The Use of Dictionaries
The Federal Circuit's expedient position that claim construction
is purely legal has created undue pressure for the court to develop a
universal formula, buttressed by specific rules, for arriving at the
proper interpretation of patent claims.13 6  After all, if claim
construction were purely an issue of law, then claim construction
should be amenable to an orderly analysis by rules.'37 This pressure,
born of the ill-conceived view that there are no underlying facts
involved in claim construction, has led to an unfortunate amount of
confusion and inconsistency in the substantive law of claim
construction. The development of the law related to the use of
dictionary definitions in claim construction provides one example of
the unfortunate effects of this pressure.
Shortly after the Markman decisions of the Federal Circuit and
the Supreme Court were issued, the Federal Circuit issued an opinion
in Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 38 in which it set forth a
hierarchy of sources to be used by judges in construing patent claims.
In the Vitronics case, a panel of the Federal Circuit divided these
sources into two major categories: intrinsic evidence, consisting of the
words of the patent claims, the patent specification and the
prosecution history of the patent;' 39 and extrinsic evidence, consisting
of evidence that is "external to the patent and file history," such as
expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and technical treatises and
135. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330-35 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Mayer,
J., joined by Newman, J., dissenting) (In his dissent criticizing the Federal Circuit's position that
claim construction is purely a matter of law without any factual component Judge Mayer said
that "Eloquent words can mask much mischief').
136. Markman, 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (In its Markman decision, the Federal
Circuit majority spoke of the benefits to both patentees and their competitors of arriving at "the
true and consistent scope of the claims." The Federal Circuit cited the desirability of having "a
judge, trained in the law" as the party to "analyze the text of the patent and its associated public
record and apply the established rules of construction" in order to achieve this goal (emphasis
added)).
137. See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and Common Law ofPatents, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 51,
76-84 (2010) (Discussing rules versus standards in patent law, Nard expresses a preference for
rules in the area of claim construction in which the value of certainty is stressed but notes the
uncertainty inherent in claim interpretation).
138. Vitronics Corp v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
139. Id. at 1582-84.
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articles.1 40 The Vitronics court made it clear that intrinsic evidence is
favored over extrinsic evidence in construing claims for a number of
reasons. Intrinsic evidence embraces any special meaning
contemporaneously given to claim language by the inventor. 14 1 It
encompasses the written description of the invention,142 and includes
any "express representations" made by the patent applicant during
patent prosecution regarding the scope of the claims.14 3 Perhaps most
importantly, it forms the public record of the patent.144
According to the court in Vitronics, in most cases the intrinsic
evidence is sufficient to resolve any ambiguities in claim language.14 5
As a result, extrinsic evidence should only be relied upon by a judge
in construing claims in the uncommon situation in which the intrinsic
record does not resolve an ambiguity in a disputed claim term.14 6 In
no event, according to the Vitronics court, may extrinsic evidence be
used to vary or contradict the claim language or the express or
implied definition of claim terms in the specification or prosecution
history. 14
While the Federal Circuit's opinion in the Vitronics case
discussed the relative importance of various sources to be utilized in
claim construction, it did not enunciate a sequential series of steps to
be undertaken and rules to be applied at each stage in order to arrive
at the proper construction of a patent claim.' 48 However, a line of
cases emerged after Vitronics that attempted to set forth just such a
methodology, relying heavily upon the use of dictionaries in claim
construction.149
In the years immediately following the issuance of the Markman
140. Id.
141. A patentee may be his or her own lexicographer provided that the special meaning is
stated in or apparent from the patent specification or prosecution history. Id. at 1582.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1583. ("The claims, specification, and file history, rather than extrinsic
evidence, constitute the public record of the patentee's claim, a record on which the public is
entitled to rely.").
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1583-85.
148. A careful reading of the Vitronics case reveals that the court distinguished between
consulting various types of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence and relying upon such evidence. The
court clearly indicated that it was proper for a judge to consult both types of evidence. Id at
1584 ("Moreover, even if the judge permissibly decided to hear all the possible evidence before
construing the claim ... .) (emphasis added.) On the other hand, the court indicated that in some
instances the extrinsic evidence should be given no weight or should not be relied upon in
construing the claims. Id.
149. See, e.g., Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F. 3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Eon Labs Mfg., 363 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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and the Vitronics cases, the Federal Circuit was not consistent in its
approach to claim construction. Depending upon the judges making
up any particular panel, the overall approach to claim construction
varied.150 The approaches taken have been categorized by different
scholars, using distinctions such as "hypertextualism" versus
"pragmatic textualism,"' 5' and "procedural" versus "holistic." 152 It
was within this context that the line of cases placing particular
emphasis on the use of dictionaries developed.
While the Federal Circuit had pointed out in Vitronics that
dictionaries are "worthy of special note" as extrinsic resources which
judges can consult at any time and rely upon in appropriate
circumstances, 153  the line of cases emphasizing dictionaries
eventually elevated dictionaries from a category of extrinsic evidence
to the starting point for claim construction. 154 The leading case in this
line, Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,' 55 extolled the
virtues of dictionaries as "objective," "publicly available," and
"reliable" sources concerning the "established meanings" of claim
terms, that provide "unbiased reflections of common understanding,"
untainted by post patent filing motives, such as those present in
litigation.156  The court in the Texas Digital case applied a
"presumption in favor of a dictionary definition" in claim
construction, which could be rebutted by an examination of the
intrinsic record to determine if the patentee had "set forth an explicit
150. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment ofJudicial Performance, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1105, 1161 (2004).
151. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 4-6
(2000). By 2000, Nard categorized the prominent approach by the Federal Circuit as
"hypertextualism," a "highly formalistic approach" that emphasizes "textual fidelity and internal
textual coherence" in intrinsic sources with little emphasis on extrinsic evidence. Id. at 5. Nard
categorized the competing approach as "pragmatic textualism," which emphasizes both internal
coherence and extrinsic context. Id. at 6.
152. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 150, at 1133-34. By 2004, Wagner and
Petherbridge categorize the predominant approach as "procedural" (id. at 1170), a hierarchical
approach favoring the ordinary meaning of claim language and frequently relying upon
dictionaries. Id. at 1133. They categorize the alternate approach as "holistic," a "free form
approach" that seeks meaning based on the "particular circumstances." Id. at 1134.
153. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(noting that judges "may also rely on dictionary definitions when construing claim terms, so
long as the dictionary definition does not contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a
reading of the patent documents").
154. See, e.g., Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F. 3d 1193, 1203 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (referring to dictionaries and stating that "categorizing them as 'extrinsic evidence' or
even a 'special form of extrinsic evidence' is misplaced and does not inform the analysis" (Id. at
1203)); Novartis Pharm. Corp. at 1308 (noting that "under our precedent, we begin our claim
construction analysis with an examination of general purpose dictionary definitions").
155. Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F. 3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
156. Id. at 1203.
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definition of the term different from its ordinary meaning," or had
"disavowed or disclaimed" any of the ordinary meaning of the claim
term.' 57 The court also noted in Texas Digital that referring to
dictionaries had an advantage over any approach that began with
consulting the written description in the patent specification and the
prosecution history, since the latter "invites a violation" of Federal
Circuit precedent that counsels against "importing limitations into the
claims." 58
The line of "dictionary" cases had the perceived advantage of
providing a more orderly formula for claim construction than other
approaches, such as the "holistic" or "pragmatic textualism" cases.15 9
The "dictionary" cases were therefore compatible with the fiction that
claim construction is purely an issue of law and could be dealt with
under a rules based approach. However, the methodology that these
cases espoused was contrary to long-established principles concerning
the importance of the public record associated with patents. The
public record of a patent, consisting of the patent claims, the
specification and the prosecution history, had long been held to
provide public notice of patent rights.16 0
The methodology set forth in the "dictionary" cases was
ultimately discredited by the Federal Circuit sitting en banc in the
Phillips v. A WH Corp.161 case. In Phillips, the Federal Circuit stressed
the importance of the specification in claim interpretation,162
reemphasizing its statement in Vitronics that the specification is "the
single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term."16 3 The court in
Phillips also pointed out the importance of the prosecution history.164
In discussing claim language, the court repeatedly emphasized that it
is the ordinary and customary meaning of claim terms from the
vantage point of "a person of ordinary skill in the art" that is
important.16 5 The court rejected the methodology in the "dictionary"
line of cases on the basis that it placed too much reliance on an
extrinsic source, a dictionary definition, and too little emphasis on the
157. Id. at 1204 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 1204.
159. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 150, at 1134; Nard, supra note 151, at 6.
160. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996); Graham
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 33 (1966); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (en banc).
161. Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303.
162. Id at 1315-17.
163. Id at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.
Cir. 1996)).
164. Id. at 1317.
165. Id. at 1312-16, 1318-19.
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specification and prosecution history.' 66 Stating that there is "no
magic formula or catechism" for claim construction, the Phillips court
confirmed the general guidelines set forth in the Vitronics case, and
expressly stated that a judge need not consult evidence in any
particular order.16 7
Although the Federal Circuit has rejected the rigid approach set
forth in the dictionary cases, the pressure to come up with a highly
formalized, rules-based methodology for claim construction remains,
largely as a result of the Federal Circuit's fiction that claim
construction is purely an issue of law. This pressure will create further
confusion and tension in the substantive law of claim construction
until the Federal Circuit dissipates it by acknowledging the factual
underpinnings of claim construction.
2. The Use of Expert Testimony and Expert Evidence
The Federal Circuit's convenient fiction that claim construction
is purely an issue of law has also created problems for judges in the
area of expert testimony and other forms of expert evidence.
The Federal Circuit's Markman decision attempted to rationalize
the usefulness of expert testimony and expert evidence in claim
construction while denying that such evidence pertains to issues of
fact involved in the construction of the words of patent claims
themselves. On one hand, the majority opinion in Markman referred
to the usefulness of expert testimony and other extrinsic evidence to
explain "the meaning of technical terms, and terms of art that appear
in the patent and file history," quoting and citing Supreme Court
precedent in support of its statements.16 8 On the other hand, the court
stated:
Through this process of construing claims by, among other things,
using certain extrinsic evidence that the court finds helpful and
rejecting other evidence as unhelpful, and resolving disputes en
route to pronouncing the meaning of claim language as a matter of
law based on the patent documents themselves, the court is not
crediting certain evidence over other evidence or making factual
166. Id. at 1320-22.
167. Id. at 1324.
168. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980-81 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Among other cases, the Federal Circuit majority cited a Supreme Court case in which a
patentee's testimony was relied upon in claim construction as "the 'clearest exposition of the
significance which the terms employed in the claims had for those skilled in the art."' Id at 980
(quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 233 (1942)).
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evidentiary findings. 169
The Federal Circuit downplayed the existence of ambiguity in patent
language,17 0  stressing the use of expert testimony for general
background purposes in most cases rather than for claim construction
purposes: "[i]t is not ambiguity in the document that creates the need
for extrinsic evidence but rather unfamiliarity of the court with the
terminology of the art to which the patent is addressed." '7
The Federal Circuit cases following Markman have also
continued the fiction that expert testimony and evidence used in claim
construction do not relate to factual issues of claim interpretation. In
Vitronics, the Federal Circuit again acknowledged that expert
testimony could be consulted in claim construction if the intrinsic
record were ambiguous, provided that the expert testimony was not
used to "vary or contradict the claim language."l 72 However, the
Vitronics court also stressed the difference between utilizing expert
testimony to understand the pertinent technology in general rather
than to construe a claim term,17 3 a difference that can sometimes be
illusive at best. Subsequent Federal Circuit cases have discussed a
number of uses for expert testimony and expert evidence, giving top
billing to those uses that supposedly fall short of actual reliance upon
the expert testimony or expert evidence to ascertain the meaning of
claim language. 174
Since issuing its Markman decision, the Federal Circuit has
consistently discussed three principle uses for expert testimony and
evidence. First, the trial judge may consult extrinsic technical
evidence to obtain background information on the pertinent
169. Markman, 52 F.3d at 981 (emphasis in original).
170. Id. at 986 (majority cited the disclosure requirements under the patent statutes to
support its statement that "ideally there should be no 'ambiguity' in claim language to one of
ordinary skill in the art."). Id. (majority also cited the review of patents by patent examiners and
stated that "[i]fthe patent's claims are sufficiently unambiguous for the PTO, there should exist
no factual ambiguity when those same claims are later construed by a court of law in an
infringement action.").
171. Id.
172. Vitronics Corp v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
173. Id. at 1585 ("But testimony on the technology is far different from other expert
testimony, whether it be of an attorney, a technical expert, or the inventor, on the proper
construction of a disputed claim term . . . ') (emphasis in original).
174. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (discussing the use
of expert testimony for technical background, for an understanding of how an invention works,
to ensure that the court's understanding of the technical aspects of the patent comports with that
of a person having ordinary skill in the art, and finally mentioning its use as support for
construing a particular term); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett Packard, 182 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed.
Cir. 2005); Serio-US Industries, Inc. v. Plastic Recovery Technologies Corp., 459 F.3d 1311,
1319 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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technology in general and the invention in particular.175 Second, the
trial judge may consult extrinsic technical evidence to confirm that
the construction of a term of art in the claim that the trial judge is
leaning towards based upon the intrinsic record is consistent with its
meaning to those of skill in the pertinent art.17 6 Third, the trial court
may, in appropriate circumstances, rely on expert technical evidence
to construe a term of art in the claim when the intrinsic record is
insufficient or ambiguous.177 The Federal Circuit has consistently
deemphasized the use of expert testimony and evidence to interpret
the meaning of a term of art in a patent claim, since this scenario is
the most difficult to justify in terms of the fiction that claim
construction is purely legal.
As previously discussed, the Federal Circuit's majority analysis
in Markman is not without critics on the Federal Circuit. In her
dissent in Markman, Judge Newman decried the position that there
are no underlying facts involved in construing terms of art, stating
that "the meaning and scope of disputed technologic and other terms
of art in particular usage are classic questions of fact."" In Phillips,
Judge Mayer stated that such disputed issues in claim construction are
"inherently factual."1 7 9
The tortured state of the law regarding the use of expert
testimony and expert evidence in claim construction, coupled with
denials that such evidence pertains to issues of fact involved in the
construction of the words of patent claims themselves, has created an
untenable situation for trial judges. There is an incentive for trial
judges to employ subterfuge, relying on technical expert testimony to
resolve factual issues involved in claim construction but at the same
time stating in opinions that the expert testimony was used for
purposes of general background information. In any event, trial
judges are aware that they often need to use expert testimony to
define a term of art, and that in doing so they are deciding an issue of
175. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318.
176. See Pitney Bowes, Inc., 182 F.3d at 1309 ("Thus, under Vitronics, it is entirely
appropriate, perhaps even preferable, for a court to consult trustworthy extrinsic evidence to
ensure that the claim construction it is tending to from the patent file is not inconsistent with
clearly expressed, plainly apposite, and widely held understandings in the pertinent technical
field."); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318.
177. See Vitronics Corporation, 90 F.3d at 1584 ("No doubt there will be instances in
which intrinsic evidence is insufficient to enable the court to determine the meaning of the
asserted claims, and in those instances, extrinsic evidence ... may also properly be relied on to
understand the technology and to construe the claims.") (emphasis added).
178. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Newman, J. dissenting).
179. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1332 (Mayer, J., joined by Newman, J., dissenting).
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fact for which they will not receive deference on appeal. 80
The confusion in this area of the law will not be corrected until
the issue of the true nature of claim construction is resolved, and the
existence of underlying factual issues is acknowledged. Moreover, the
problems are a direct result of the manner in which the Federal Circuit
addressed the Seventh Amendment issue in its Markman analysis.
The Supreme Court's Seventh Amendment analysis in its Markman
decision does not create these same problems. Judges can decide
underlying questions of fact in any "mongrel practice" that is
determined to fall within their purview under the Seventh
Amendment.
3. The Perspective of One of Ordinary Skill in the Art
Perhaps the most fundamental tension that has been created as a
result of the Federal Circuit's Markman analysis exists between the
Federal Circuit's Seventh Amendment inspired fiction that claim
construction is purely an issue of law and the role of the hypothetical
person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. While it has long been
settled in patent law that patent claims should be interpreted from the
perspective of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art,'8 ' the Federal
Circuit's position on the nature of claim construction is at odds with
this basic tenet of patent law.
Patents are issued pursuant to the constitutional grant of
authority to Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."' 82
Patents extend intellectual property rights for inventions. As the
Federal Circuit has therefore noted: "[i]ndeed, a patent is both a
technical and a legal document." 8 3
Since patents deal with technical subject matter and patent
claims are to be construed from the point of view of a hypothetical
180. See Kathleen M. O'Malley, Patti Saris & Ronald H. Whyte, A Panel Discussion:
Claim Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 671,
679-80 (2004) (discussing factual inquiries underlying claim construction that are subjected to
de novo review on appeal, such as how to define one of ordinary skill in a particular art and
determine that person's understanding of a claim term at the relevant time).
181. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 ("We have made clear, moreover, that the ordinary and
customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of
ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date
of the patent application."); see also Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298,
1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (A judge must interpret "the technical aspects of the document, and
indeed its overall meaning, from the vantage point of one skilled in the art.").
182. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
183. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 182 F.3d at 1309.
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person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, it is not surprising that the
Federal Circuit has consistently stated that extrinsic evidence in the
form of technical dictionaries, expert testimony, technical treatises
and articles, prior art references, and inventor testimony may be used
by the trial court, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner, in the process of claim construction.184 The Federal Circuit
has acknowledged that these extrinsic sources are important because
"the meaning of a claim term as understood by persons of skill in the
art is often not immediately apparent" and because "patentees
frequently use terms idiosyncratically."185 Nevertheless, as previously
discussed, the Federal Circuit has downplayed reliance on technical
extrinsic evidence as the basis for the interpretation of technical terms
of art in a claim, thereby creating tension with the stated goal of
interpreting claims from the vantage point of one of ordinary skill in
the pertinent art.186
This tension has been apparent in the Federal Circuit decisions
starting with the Markman decision itself. In its Markman opinion the
Federal Circuit emphasized that in construing claim terms "the focus
is on the objective test of what one of ordinary skill in the art at the
time of the invention would have understood the term to mean."187
While the Federal Circuit has continued to endorse the importance of
the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art in
construing claims, it has also continued to try to prop up its fiction
that there are no underlying questions of fact involved in claim
construction by stating that instances in which the intrinsic record is
184. See, e.g., Vitronics Corp v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(The court discusses the use of expert testimony, inventor testimony, dictionaries, technical
treatises and articles, and prior art. With respect to prior art, the court stated that "[a]s compared
to expert testimony, which often only indicates what a particular expert believes a term means,
prior art references may also be more indicative of what all those skilled in the art generally
believe a certain term means."); Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314, 1318 (discussing in general the use
of "extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms,
and the state of the art," as well as discussing in particular technical dictionaries and expert
testimony); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1555 (Fed. Cir.
1997) ("[T]he testimony of one skilled in the art about the meaning of claim terms at the time of
the invention will almost always qualify as relevant evidence."). It is important to note that the
important issues are not related to the admissibility of the technical evidence, but to the use
made of the technical evidence. Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1308 n.2 ("Vitronics, however, did
not decide under what circumstances expert testimony should be admitted or excluded, but
merely concerns whether and under what circumstances courts can rely on already admitted
extrinsic evidence as dispositive in their claim constructions.").
185. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.
186. See, e.g., Nard, supra note 151, at 82 (Nard points out the contradiction in an
approach that purports to construe claim language from the perspective of one of ordinary skill
in the pertinent art while at the same time "eschew[ing] the use of extrinsic evidence, thus
distancing itself from the very industry its ultimate interpretation will most directly affect.").
187. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
2011] 367
368 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 27
insufficient to construe the claims "will rarely, if ever, occur.""' This
certainly contradicts the reality of many patent disputes. As Judge
Mayer observed in his dissent in Phillips, the meaning of disputed
claim terms is "hotly contested by the parties, not by resort to case
law as one would expect for legal issues, but based on testimony and
documentary evidence."l 8 9
The Federal Circuit's current position that claim construction is
purely legal has led to the recent suggestion in the academic literature
that claims should be interpreted from the perspective of a patent
attorney rather than from one of ordinary skill in the relevant art.190 1
believe the better course is to correct the Federal Circuit's erroneous
persistence in perpetuating its own Seventh Amendment analysis in
its Markman decision rather than the analysis set forth by the
Supreme Court. The Federal Circuit needs to acknowledge that there
are underlying fact issues involved in claim construction that relate to
the meaning of terms of art from the perspective of one of ordinary
skill in the art, and embrace the "mongrel practice" view of the
Supreme Court. Once that occurs, the important position of the
hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art will be back on a firm
platform.
II. SEVENTH AMENDMENT DECISIONS AND THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS
A. The Federal Circuit's Infringement Approach to the
Doctrine ofEquivalents as Purely an Issue ofFact
Not only has the Federal Circuit's flawed approach to Seventh
Amendment issues led to problems in the area of claim construction,
but the approach has also adversely impacted the substantive law
related to the doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents is
an area of the law, like claim construction, that is related to claim
scope. Under the doctrine of equivalents, however, a patent may be
enforced beyond the literal reach of its claims as properly
construed.'9' The doctrine of equivalents has been applied by the
courts for over a century although it is not explicitly covered in the
188. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583-85.
189. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1332 (Mayer, J., joined by Newman, J., dissenting).
190. John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According To Their Interpretive
Community: A Call For An Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 327
(2008).
191. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21(1997);
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950).
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patent statutes.192 Its theoretical underpinnings have been a major
source of controversy in patent law.' 93
In Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.,1 94 the
Federal Circuit confronted en banc the issue of whether a judge or
jury should determine infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.195 The issue was raised in the jury case as a result of an
argument by the defendant that infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents presented an equitable issue and therefore should be
determined by the judge.' 9 6  While the Supreme Court in its
subsequent Markman decision 9 7 clearly approached the question of
whether a jury should be involved in construing a term of art in a
patent claim, an issue related to claim scope, as a Seventh
Amendment issue,19 8 the majority of the Federal Circuit in Hilton
Davis followed the course it had set in its prior Markman decision and
avoided an in-depth Seventh Amendment analysis. In fact, the Federal
Circuit majority in Hilton Davis completely ignored the Seventh
Amendment. While the Federal Circuit majority in Markman had
briefly discussed the Seventh Amendment in rebuttal to the dissenting
and one of the concurring opinions in that case,' 9 9 there is no mention
192. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1525 (Fed. Cir.
1995), rev don other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (The Federal Circuit majority acknowledges
that there is no "general remedy for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents" expressly
provided in the patent statutes, but notes that the doctrine has been applied by the Supreme
Court for a century in "decisions issued under a stable statutory regime.").
193. See, e.g., Meurer & Nard, supra note 10.
194. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The
Hilton Davis case involved an issue of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents of a patent
related to an ultrafiltration process for purifying dyes. Id. at 1515. The broad independent claim
of the patent set forth parameters for the pore diameter of the membrane for the ultrafiltration
process, and set forth the range of pH values (measuring the acidity or alkalinity) and the
pressures for the process. Id. Because the defendant did not fall within the stated ranges of pH
values, and also sometimes operated outside the claimed pressure range, the sole theory of
infringement raised was the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 1516; Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at
23. The limitation in the claim relating to the pH range ("at a pH from approximately 6.0 to
9.0") was added to the claim during prosecution to distinguish the invention claimed from the
invention in a previously issued patent. Hilton Davis Chem., 62 F.3d at 1515-16.
195. Id. at 1516. The Federal Circuit took the case en banc to decide three specific issues
relating to: (1) the specific test for determining infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,
(2) whether a judge or jury should decide the issue of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, and (3) whether application of the doctrine of equivalents is discretionary. Id. at
1516 n. 1, 1516. The en bane decision was issued per curiam, and there was one concurring
opinion and three dissenting opinions. Id. at 1514. The issue of validity of the patent was
assigned to the panel that originally heard the appeal. Id. at 1515 n. 1.
196. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 23.
197. The Supreme Court's Markman decision was issued on April 23, 1996 (Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 37), and the Federal Circuit's decision in Hilton Davis
was issued on August 8, 1995 (Hilton Davis Chem., 62 F.3d at 1512).
198. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
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whatsoever of the Seventh Amendment anywhere in the majority en
banc decision in Hilton Davis.20 0 Nor is there any application of the
historical approach favored by the Supreme Court for Seventh
Amendment issues.201
The Federal Circuit majority framed the issue relating to whether
a judge or jury should apply the doctrine of equivalents as follows:
Is the issue of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents an
equitable remedy to be decided by the court, or is it, like literal
infringement, an issue of fact to be submitted to the jury in a jury
case? 02
The statement of the issue by the majority appears to jumble what
should be two separate distinctions: the distinction between law and
equity, which is critical to the application of the Seventh Amendment
under the historical approach; 2 03 and the distinction between law and
fact, the distinction relied upon by the Federal Circuit in its Markman
analysis. As a result, it is not surprising that the Federal Circuit's
analysis in Hilton Davis is no more principled than its Seventh
Amendment analysis in its Markman decision.
In keeping with the analysis in its Markman decision, the
majority of the Federal Circuit in Hilton Davis relied primarily on a
fact versus law distinction in reaching its holding on the Seventh
Amendment issue related to the doctrine of equivalents.2 04 The
majority quoted the Supreme Court's landmark case on the doctrine
of equivalents, Graver Tank, including the statement that "[a] finding
of equivalence is a determination of fact." 205 While relying upon
Graver Tank and other cited Supreme Court precedent, the Federal
Circuit majority refrained the Supreme Court's statement, defining
infringement in general as a factual inquiry: "[i]nfringement, whether
literal or under the doctrine of equivalents, is a question of fact." 2 06
This subtle but significant refraining of the Supreme Court's
statement in Graver Tank was in line with the flawed approach to
Seventh Amendment issues displayed by the Federal Circuit majority
200. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1543 (Plager, J., joined by Archer, C.J., Rich, J. and Lourie,
J., dissenting) (The only mention of the Seventh Amendment in the entire case is in one of the
dissenting opinions. Judge Plager briefly notes that the majority does not suggest that there is a
right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment for the doctrine of equivalents).
201. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
202. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1516.
203. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
204. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1520-22.
205. Id. at 1520 (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S.
605, 609 (1950)).
206. Id.
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in its earlier Markman decision.
In Markman, the Federal Circuit majority expressly framed the
issue of whether a jury should be involved in claim construction in
terms of distinguishing law from fact, and defined claim construction
as purely an issue of law.2 07 In doing so, the Federal Circuit majority
stated that its decision does not deprive parties of the right to have a
patent infringement case tried to a jury, but "merely holds that part of
the infringement inquiry, construing and determining the scope of
claims in a patent, is strictly a legal question for the court.",2 0 8 In
seeking to support this proposition, the majority in Markman
distinguished claim construction from a determination of
infringement: "[t]he patentee's right to a jury trial on the application
of the properly construed claim to the accused device is preserved as
it was in 1791."209
In Hilton Davis, the majority also relied primarily upon an
analysis distinguishing law from fact, classifying the doctrine of
equivalents as an issue of infringement, which it found, in turn, to be
an issue of fact.210 In this regard, the majority opinions in Markman
and Hilton Davis represent the flip sides of the same coin. While the
Federal Circuit majority in Markman classified claim construction as
a pure issue of law, in Hilton Davis the majority repeatedly classified
infringement as a pure issue offact, including infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. The Federal Circuit majority has therefore
taken a simplified fact versus law approach to Seventh Amendment
issues related to claim scope, holding that claim construction goes to
the judge as a pure issue of law and all infringement issues go to the
jury, injury cases, as pure issues of fact.
The simplified overall approach that infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents is purely an issue of fact, however, is a view
that was contested by a number of judges on the Federal Circuit in
Hilton Davis. Five of a total of twelve judges on the Federal Circuit
who participated in the outcome of the case joined in different
207. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
208. Supra note 98 and accompanying text.
209. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 984 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also
id at 976 (In criticizing the use of authority in McGill Inc. v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 975
(Fed Cir. 1984), a case which held that claim construction may involve underlying questions of
fact, the majority of the Federal Circuit in Marlanan stated that McGill relied erroneously upon
Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The Federal Circuit
majority in Marknan quoted Envirotech for the proposition that claim construction is an issue of
law, while a determination of infringement, i.e., whether the accused device is covered by the
claims as construed, is a question of fact.).
210. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1520, 1522, 1525.
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groupings in support of three separate dissents.2 1 1
Two of the dissenting judges expressly concluded that "a finding
of infringement under the doctrine is a mixed question of law and
fact," 2 12 recognizing specific issues of law involved in the application
of the doctrine of equivalents.213 These two judges specifically
disagreed with the Federal Circuit majority's reliance on the Supreme
Court's statement in Graver Tank that "[a] finding of equivalence is a
determination of fact" to support a holding in Hilton Davis that the
doctrine of equivalents is solely an issue of fact. 2 14 According to these
dissenting judges, the Supreme Court statement must be read in
context, and the Federal Circuit majority's use of the quoted language
to support its holding "would be a remarkable change from what the
law had been."215 The Graver Tank case involved the accused
infringer's substitution of an ingredient in a claimed formula for a
flux used in an electrical welding process.216 Reading the Supreme
Court's statement in context, the two dissenting judges interpreted it
to mean that the issue of whether the substitution "constitutes
equivalency" is a determination of fact.2 17 The dissenting judges still
regarded the determination of the proper scope of the claim under the
doctrine of equivalents as an issue of law for the court.218
While two of the dissenting judges explicitly disagreed with the
majority's characterization of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents as a purely factual issue, it is also arguable that the
remaining dissenting judges implicitly disagreed. The remaining
dissenting judges referred to both questions of fact and conclusions of
law in discussing the resolution of doctrine of equivalents issues. 219
211. Id at 1514; see also Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Co., 520 U.S. 17, 23
(1997).
212. Hilton Davis at 1579.
213. Id. at 1570-79, 1582-83 (Nies, J., joined by Archer, C.J. dissenting).
214. Id. at 1578.
215. Id.
216. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950).
217. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1578 (Nies, J., joined by Archer, C.J. dissenting). See also
id. at 1577 (emphasis added in Supreme Court quotations from Graver Tank to support
interpretation).
218. Id. at 1578.
219. See id. at 1543-44 (Plager, J., joined by Archer, C.J., Rich, J. and Lourie, J.
dissenting). In setting out the position that the doctrine of equivalents is equitable in its
"jurisprudential roots," Judge Plager refers to a possible alternate solution of having both the
judge and jury involved. The judge would determine whether "the differences between the
patent claims and the allegedly infringing product are so insubstantial, and the circumstances so
sufficiently special, as to warrant making the remedy afforded by the doctrine of equivalents
available" and the jury would apply the doctrine if available. Id. Judge Plager refers to related
"findings of fact and conclusions oflaw," in this method, implicitly taking the view that the
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Despite the dissents, however, the majority relied heavily upon the
view that the doctrine of equivalents should be characterized as purely
an issue of fact in reaching its Seventh Amendment holding.220
Of course, the majority could not fairly reach a determination
that a jury should decide the issue of the doctrine of equivalents in a
jury case based solely upon a classification of the issue as one of fact.
A judge exercising equitable powers may find facts and therefore it
does not necessarily follow that an issue should be given to a jury
because it is categorized as one of fact, as pointed out in a rather
caustic manner in one of the dissents in the case.221 While the
majority did not directly acknowledge the point made in the dissent,
the majority did very briefly discuss whether application of the
doctrine of equivalents is equitable in nature,2 2 2 the issue expressly
raised by the defendant.
The majority ran up against an obstacle in the form of precedent
in its quest to rely upon the fact versus law distinction and thereby
assign what it had categorized as a factual issue to the jury. The
majority acknowledged that "[i]n several recent opinions, this court
has referred to the doctrine of equivalents as 'equitable,"' 2 23 citing to
six of its opinions dating from 1985.224 The majority, however, made
short shrift of its past statements that had referred to the doctrine of
equivalents as "equitable," declaring that the past statements had
meant to convey the notion of "general fairness:"
The term 'equitable' can have many meanings. The Supreme Court
explained in Graver Tank that the doctrine prevents the unfairness
of depriving the patent owner of effective protection of its
invention, . . . thereby achieving a fair or 'equitable' result. Thus,
in doctrine of equivalents cases, this court's allusions to e ity
invoke equity in its broadest sense-equity as general fairness.
The majority also summarily dismissed any notion that either the
Supreme Court or the Federal Circuit had ever taken the position that
the doctrine of equivalents involved "equity in the technical sense:"
application of the doctrine of equivalents is not purely an issue of fact. Id. at 1544 (emphasis
added).
220. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
221. Hilton Davis. at 1541 (Plager, J., joined by Archer, C.J., Rich, J. and Lourie, J.
dissenting) (after noting the majority's statement that infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents is a question of fact, Plager points out: "'[b]ut the court follows that statement with
the conclusion that, since infringement by equivalents is a question of fact it must therefore be a
question for a jury, as if equity courts in the course of their work never decide factual issues.").
222. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521.
223. Id. (footnote omitted).
224. Id. at 1521 n.2.
225. Id. at 1521 (citing Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607) (citation omitted).
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By referring to the doctrine as a doctrine of fairness, neither the
Supreme Court nor this court has invoked the myriad implications
of an alternative to legal remedies. In addition, neither the Supreme
Court nor this court has invoked equity in the technical sense of a
set of principles originating in England to compensate for the
historically harsh rules of common law. 226
The majority declared that it was significant that the Supreme Court
in Graver Tank did not discuss "any of the principles commonly
attending the chancellor's invocation of equitable power," such as the
doctrine of "clean hands," the balancing of equities, an elevated
burden of proof, or an abuse of discretion standard of review. 2 27 The
majority cited Supreme Court cases for the proposition that "every
patent owner is entitled to invoke the doctrine of equivalents-a
proposition inimical to the hypothesis that the doctrine is
equitable."2 28 Finally, the majority stated that in Graver Tank the
Supreme Court identified its decision in Winans v. Denmead,2 2 9 an
action at law, as the genesis of the doctrine of equivalents, and that
Graver Tank "did not impliedly transform a legal basis for recovery
into an equitable one."230
The Federal Circuit analyzed the issue of whether a judge or jury
should determine infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
within a larger discussion in the opinion that also addressed the
proper test for applying the doctrine of equivalents.2 3 1 In addressing
the proper test, the Federal Circuit majority commented upon the
significance of certain arguably equitable factors that had been
identified in the Supreme Court's decision in Graver Tank as relevant
to the application of the doctrine of equivalents. In Graver Tank, the
Supreme Court had stated that "[t]he essence of the doctrine is that
one may not practice a fraud on a patent." 232 Further, the Supreme
Court spoke of the doctrine as discouraging the "unscrupulous
copyist," 2 33 had used additional judgmental language to describe the
infringer under the doctrine of equivalents as a "pirate" engaged in
"stealing," 23 4 and had spoken approvingly of reliance upon factors
226. Id. at 1521.
227. Id
228. Id
229. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
230. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521.
231. Id. at 1516-21.
232. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
233. Id. at 607.
234. Id. at 607-08.
THE SEVENTH AMEND. RIPPLE EFFECT
such as imitation versus independent research.235
In addressing the Graver Tank case, the Federal Circuit majority
in Hilton Davis discussed its interpretation of the relevance of
whether the accused infringer had imitated or copied the claimed
invention, designed around it, or engaged in independent research.2 36
The Federal Circuit majority explicitly held that the overriding
inquiry for the application of the doctrine of equivalents consists of an
objective assessment of whether the differences between the claimed
invention and the accused product or process are substantial.237 The
majority then set forth the position that copying was relevant to an
inquiry into the application of the doctrine of equivalence, not
because it shed light on any evil motive of the alleged infringer, but
because "copying suggests that the differences between the claimed
and accused products or processes-measured objectively-are
insubstantial."2 38 Conversely, the majority stated that evidence of
"designing around" a patent suggests that the differences between the
claimed invention and the accused product or process are substantial:
"the fact-finder may infer that the competitor, presumably one of skill
in the art, has designed substantial changes into the new product to
avoid infringement." 239 The majority rejected any notion that "bad
faith," "evil intent," or "culpable conduct" are required for application
of the doctrine of equivalents, stating that the Supreme Court applied
the doctrine "to prevent 'fraud on a patent,' not fraud by the accused
infringer." 24 0
While the majority refused to find that the doctrine of
equivalents has any equitable component at all in a technical sense,24 1
a number of judges strongly disagreed with that conclusion. 24 2
Furthermore, the majority's conclusory and superficial treatment of
precedent, summarily equating the past characterization of the
doctrine of equivalents as "equitable" with "general fairness,"
235. Id. at 612.
236. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519-20.
237. Id. at 1518.
238. Id. at 1519.
239. Id. at 1520.
240. Id. at 1519 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co, 339 U.S. at
608).
241. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1523.
242. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1540-45 (Plager, J., joined by Archer, C., Rich, J., and
Lourie, J., dissenting); id. at 1542 ("The majority's failure-or refusal-to acknowledge the
uniquely equitable nature of the doctrine of equivalents with its built-in constraints leads to a
basic error in the opinion . . . ."); see also id. at 1550 (Lourie, J., joined by Rich, J., and Plager,
J., dissenting) ("I consider that the DOE is an equitable remedy for the judge to decide whether
to apply, or not to apply . . . .").
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prompted one dissenting judge to label the majority's analysis of the
issue as "ipse dixit." 24 3 The same dissenting judge pointed out that in
Graver Tank the Supreme Court did not discuss the equitable issues
of "clean hands," the abuse of discretion standard of review or a
balancing of the equities because the issues were not before the
Court.24 4 Nevertheless, the majority dismissed equity245 in its dubious
comparison of equity and fact.
In arriving at its holding that in a jury trial the issue of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents should be submitted to
the jury,24 6 the majority in Hilton Davis consistently jumbled the
distinction between law and equity with the distinction between law
and fact, as it had in framing the issue. As an example, in
characterizing past references by the Supreme Court to "equity" as
general fairness, the Federal Circuit majority stated as follows:
"[w]hile recognizing the equity, or fairness, promoted by the doctrine
of equivalents, furthermore, the Supreme Court stated unequivocally
that application of the doctrine is a question of fact." 24 7 In its holding
on the issue, the majority referred to infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents as an "issue of fact." The repeated juxtaposition of
equity and fact, however, does not provide a sound analysis. As
pointed out in one dissent: "[t]o label something a fact issue tells us
little about who should decide it." 24 8 Judges routinely decide facts in
"traditional equitable matters." 249
Overall, the Federal Circuit majority's analysis of the Seventh
Amendment issue in Hilton Davis is flawed. The majority opinion
fails to address the Seventh Amendment. It rejects equity as a basis
for the doctrine of equivalents in a superficial manner. It fails to apply
the historical approach, confusing the distinction between law and
equity with the distinction between law and fact.
The parallels between the Federal Circuit's majority analysis in
Hilton Davis and its majority analysis in Markman are striking. First,
in each case the majority avoided the Seventh Amendment. In
243. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1542 (Plager, J., joined by Archer, C.J., Rich, J., and Lourie,
J., dissenting).
244. Id Judge Plager also pointed out that Graver Tank was a non-jury case, and that the
Supreme Court did not need to address law and equity distinctions. Id. at 1543.
245. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1523 ("The doctrine of equivalents has no equitable or
subjective component.").
246. Id. at 1522.
247. Id. at 1521.
248. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1543 (Plager, J., joined by Archer, C.J., Rich, J. and Lourie,
J. dissenting).
249. Id. (referring to "the rights of beneficiaries under trusts, mistake and fraud in contract
disputes, [and] domestic relations" as matters in which a judge decides questions of fact).
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Markman, the majority oversimplified the issue of claim construction
as purely an issue of law in order to avoid an in-depth analysis under
the Seventh Amendment. In Hilton Davis, the majority ignored the
Seventh Amendment altogether, employing a jumbled discussion of
equity and fact instead.
Second, in each case the majority essentially relied upon a fact
versus law classification. In Markman, the majority expressly framed
the issue of whether a jury should be involved in claim construction in
terms of distinguishing law from fact, and defined claim construction
as purely an issue of law. In Hilton Davis, the majority relied
primarily upon its classification of the doctrine of equivalents as an
issue of fact.
Third, in each case the majority overruled or creatively defined
its past cases in order to avoid a Seventh Amendment analysis. In
Markman, the majority overruled holdings and criticized dicta in a
"significant line" of its past cases that had taken the position that
claim construction includes issues of fact. This was necessary to
avoid an in-depth Seventh Amendment analysis. In Hilton Davis, the
majority defined references to "equity" it its past cases dealing with
the doctrine of equivalents, not to mention references to equity by the
Supreme Court in doctrine of equivalents cases, as meaning "general
fairness." This sleight of hand was also necessary to avoid a Seventh
Amendment analysis.
Unfortunately, the parallels between the two decisions arise as a
result of similar flawed analyses of Seventh Amendment issues. The
Federal Circuit majority analyses are out of line with Supreme Court
250Seventh Amendment law. It is no surprise, therefore, that the
Federal Circuit's continued reliance on the analyses has resulted in
further problems in patent law. 2 5 1
B. The Supreme Court's Failure to Resolve Seventh Amendment
Issues Regarding the Doctrine ofEquivalents in Warner-
Jenkinson
While the Supreme Court did review the Federal Circuit's
decision in the Hilton Davis case, the Court failed to reach the
Seventh Amendment issue. In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
250. See Herlihy, supra note 26, at 493-98 (discussing Supreme Court Seventh
Amendment precedent which applies the historical approach, rooted in the distinction between
law and equity, rather than an approach based upon a distinction between law and fact).
251. See discussion infra Section II.C.
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Chem. Co., 2 52 the Supreme Court reviewed the Federal Circuit's
opinion on the issues of the continued viability of the doctrine of
equivalents,253 the manner in which the test for equivalents should be
applied,254 and the scope of limitations on the doctrine of
equivalents.2 55 In its unanimous decision, the Supreme Court upheld
the continued viability of the doctrine of equivalents.25 6 With respect
to the Seventh Amendment issue raised in the case, however, the
Supreme Court expressly declined to decide it, stating as follows:
Because resolution of whether, or how much of, the application of
the doctrine of equivalents can be resolved by the court is not
necessary for us to answer the question presented, we decline to
take it up. The Federal Circuit held that it was for the jury to
decide whether the accused process was equivalent to the claimed
process. There was ample support in our prior cases for that
holding....
Whether, if the issue were squarely presented to us, we would
reach a different conclusion than did the Federal Circuit is not a
question we need decide today. 257
The Supreme Court's failure to review the Seventh Amendment
issue in the Warner-Jenkinson case was both significant and
extremely unfortunate because it has contributed to the adverse
impact of the Federal Circuit's Seventh Amendment analyses on the
development of substantive patent law. In Warner-Jenkinson, the
Supreme Court needlessly clouded the Seventh Amendment issue
related to the doctrine of equivalents and claim scope by gratuitously
offering words of endorsement for the Federal Circuit's decision that
the doctrine of equivalents should be applied by the jury, while at the
252. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
253. The Supreme Court upheld the doctrine of equivalents as not conflicting with the
provisions of the 1952 Patent Act. Id. at 25-28.
254. The Court adopted the position, espoused by Judge Nies in her dissenting opinion in
the Federal Circuit's Hilton Davis decision below, that the doctrine of equivalents should be
applied to each element of a patent claim rather than to the claim as a whole. Id. at 28-30. The
Court also concurred with the Federal Circuit's position that proof of any particular intent is not
required for application of the doctrine of equivalents, and held that the doctrine of equivalents
should not be limited to equivalents disclosed within the patent. Id. at 34-37.
255. The Supreme Court affirmed the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel as a legal
limitation on the doctrine of equivalents, but refused to adopt a rule that such an estoppel would
eliminate any application of the doctrine of equivalents to an amended claim element without
regard for the reason for the amendment. Id. at 30-32.
256. Id. at 21.
257. Id. at 38 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court also noted that
while the opinions below, and the respondents and the amici in briefs gave "considerable
attention" to the issue of whether a judge or jury should apply the doctrine of equivalents, "in
this Court petitioner makes only passing reference to this issue." Id. at 37.
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same time expressly reserving judgment on the issue.258
The Supreme Court has consistently afforded too much
deference to the Federal Circuit in Seventh Amendment issues in
patent cases. In the Markman case, while the Supreme Court did not
adopt the fact versus law approach employed by the Federal Circuit, it
did arguably strain to reach the same ultimate result and thereby
affirm the decision of the majority of the Federal Circuit that claim
construction is the sole responsibility of the judge, with no room for
jury involvement. 2 59 Further, the Supreme Court failed to comment on
the flawed fact versus law approach to the Seventh Amendment issue
that was employed by the Federal Circuit.
In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court again displayed
deference to the Federal Circuit on a Seventh Amendment issue. The
Supreme Court endorsed in dicta the result reached by the Federal
Circuit, stating: "[n]othing in our recent decision in Markman ...
necessitates a different result than that reached by the Federal
Circuit.",26 0 However, the Supreme Court failed to note that in
Markman it had analyzed the issue of whether a judge or jury should
construe patent claims under the Seventh Amendment, while the
Federal Circuit majority in Hilton Davis had failed to even mention
the Seventh Amendment in its analysis of whether a judge or jury
should apply the doctrine of equivalents. Furthermore, while the
Supreme Court addressed prosecution history estoppel, a legal
limitation on the doctrine of equivalents, in its decision in Warner-
Jenkinson ,261 it did not comment on the Federal Circuit's
characterization of the doctrine of equivalents as purely factual.
258. Id. at 38-39.
259. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 380 n.5 (1996) (The
Supreme Court refers to "concerns about the accuracy of the summary of the jury instructions,"
and "ambiguous references" in rejecting the historical case relied upon by Markman: "we cannot
infer the existence of an established practice" of having juries construe disputed terms.); id. at
381-82 (The Supreme Court refers to inferences and "probability" in finding that judges rather
than juries must have been the entity construing patent documents in eighteenth century
practice.). Whether the correct result was reached in the Supreme Court's application of Seventh
Amendment law in the Markman case, particularly in the Court's assessment of the eighteenth
century precedent cited under the historical approach (see id. at 379-84), is an issue that is
beyond the scope of this article.
260. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 38. The Supreme Court also noted that "[i]ndeed,
Markman cites with considerable favor, when discussing the role of judge and jury, the seminal
Winans decision" (id. at 38-39), which was relied upon in part by the Federal Circuit in
assigning the application of the doctrine of equivalents to the jury. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v.
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
261. Id. at 30-34. See also id. at 39 note 8 (referring to "various legal limitations on the
application of the doctrine of equivalents," which the Supreme Court states are to be determined
by the court).
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Instead, the Supreme Court failed to decide the Seventh Amendment
issue in Warner-Jenkinson, thereby leaving the jumbled analysis of
the Federal Circuit intact on that point. It is not surprising that the
combination of opinions has led to a ripple effect of confusion in
substantive patent law.
C. Confusion and Tension in the Substantive Law of the
Doctrine ofEquivalents Resulting from Seventh Amendment
Decisions
"Who are you?" said the Caterpillar.
This was not an encouraging opening for a conversation.
Alice replied, rather shyly, "I - I hardly know, sir, just at present -
at least I know who I was when I got up this morning, but I think I
must have been changed several times since then."
- Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, Lewis Carroll, Chapter 5
Prior to the Federal Circuit's pronouncements in the Hilton
Davis case, the doctrine of equivalents had been repeatedly described
as equitable in nature. 262 The Federal Circuit's superficial and
expedient recharacterization of the doctrine of equivalents as not
being grounded in equity "in the technical sense," 2 63 made while
facing a Seventh Amendment issue in Hilton Davis, combined with
the Federal Circuit's oversimplification of the doctrine of equivalents
as purely an issue of fact, has fueled a number of problems in the
substantive law regarding the application of the doctrine. The
Supreme Court's failure in Warner-Jenkinson to review the Federal
Circuit's analysis of the Seventh Amendment issue, while at the same
time lending support to the outcome reached by the Federal Circuit,
has exacerbated the problem.
262. See, e.g., Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521 (citing and quoting past Federal Circuit cases
that described or referred to the doctrine of equivalents as equitable); Donald R. Dunner & J.
Michael Jakes, The Equitable Doctrine ofEquivalents, 75 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 857,
859 (1993) (taking the position that the doctrine of equivalents began as an equitable doctrine);
Meurer & Nard, supra note 10, at 1950 (referring to the doctrine of equivalents as having
originated as "an equitable doctrine designed to correct unjust copying").
263. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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1. The Identity Crisis
The Seventh Amendment analysis of the Federal Circuit majority
in Hilton Davis has contributed to a profound identity crisis regarding
the very nature of the doctrine of equivalents. While the Federal
Circuit majority dismissed equity as the basis for the doctrine, it did
not identify any alternate grounds to support it. As a result, the
substantive law regarding the application of the doctrine of
equivalents is disjointed and uncertain.264 As Judge Plager stated in
his dissent in the Hilton Davis case:
If we are to know where we are going with the doctrine of
equivalents, we must know whence it came. The court denies that
the doctrine has its roots in a court's traditional equity powers, but
provides no substitute explanation for its origin. As a result, we are
left with two major problems that are not satisfactorily resolved:
what are the controlling bounds of the doctrine, and what are the
.265proper respective roles of judge and jury.
The consistently cited justifications for the modern doctrine of
equivalents are set forth in Graver Tank. The Supreme Court stated in
Graver Tank that "[t]he essence of the doctrine is that one may not
practice a fraud on a patent,"266 and pointed out that "to permit
imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every literal
detail would be to convert the protection of the patent grant into a
hollow and useless thing."2 67 The Supreme Court also cited earlier
precedent from the Second Circuit in its Graver Tank opinion, stating
that the doctrine may be invoked "'[tfo temper unsparing logic and
prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of the invention."'268
These Graver Tank statements explaining the need for the doctrine of
equivalents refer to "fraud," "imitation" and "stealing," terms that
connote reprehensible conduct on the part of the infringer. However,
264. See, e.g., Samoff, supra note 13, at 1166 (stating that "[tihe Supreme Court has not
imposed a standard for determining factual equivalency under the modem doctrine of
equivalents," and noting that in Warner-Jenkinson the Supreme Court "refused to select (but did
not discourage use of) any of the traditional formulations."); Matthew C. Phillips, Taking A Step
Beyond Maxwell to Tame the Doctrine ofEquivalents, 11 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent.
L.J. 155, 162 (2000) (referring to the "legal uncertainties" surrounding the doctrine of
equivalents); Meurer & Nard, supra note 10, at 1950 (referring to the "ill-defined role" of the
doctrine of equivalents).
265. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1537 (Plager, S., dissenting).
266. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)
(emphasis added).
267. Id. at 607 (emphasis added).
268. Id. at 608 (quoting Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d
Cir. Conn. 1948) (emphasis added)); see also Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1536 (Newman, Circuit
Judge, concurring) (Judge Newman states that she knows of "no improvement" upon this
statement for the invocation of the doctrine of equivalents.).
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neither the Federal Circuit nor the Supreme Court criticized or
retracted these formulations regarding the doctrine, despite stating,
respectively, that "intent is not an element" in applying the
doctrine,2 6 9 and the "better view" is that "intent plays no role in the
application of the doctrine of equivalents."2 70
In expressly cutting the doctrine of equivalents loose from any
perceived requirement that it redress culpable conduct in Warner-
Jenkinson, the Supreme Court did not deny such a benefit of the
doctrine but rather expanded the reach of the doctrine:
To be sure, Graver Tank refers to the prevention of copying and
piracy when describing the benefits of the doctrine of equivalents.
That the doctrine produces such benefits, however, does not mean
that its application is limited only to cases where those particular
benefits are obtained.271
The Supreme Court's position in this regard, coupled with the
Federal Circuit's statements denying any equitable component for the
doctrine of equivalents or any jurisprudential basis in equity, has
resulted in a body of substantive law that is amorphous and has no
guiding principle for determining an appropriate application of the
doctrine. In particular, there is disagreement among the judges of the
Federal Circuit as to the identity and importance of the factors that
should be applied in an evaluation under the doctrine of equivalents.
In Graver Tank, the Supreme Court referenced a number of
factors to be considered in applying the doctrine of equivalents,
including: copying and "imitation,"2 72 "piracy,"273 whether there were
"unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions," 274 the
status of a patented invention as a "pioneer" or a "secondary
,,275276invention,"275 the prior art, whether persons of skill in the art would
have known of the "interchangeability" of an ingredient not
mentioned in the patent with one that was included,277 whether the
accused product or process was the result of "independent
research," 2 78 as well as, generally, "the particular circumstances of the
269. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519 and 1520.
270. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 36.
271. Id. at 34.
272. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607, 612.
273. Id. at 607.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 608 (noting that for pioneer and secondary inventions "the area of equivalence
may vary").
276. Id. at 609.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 612.
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case."279 In taking the position that certain of these cited factors were
not equitable in nature or related to evil intent, the Federal Circuit
majority in Hilton Davis stated that in applying the doctrine of
equivalents the principal focus is whether the differences between the
claimed invention and the accused product or process are
substantial. 2 80 The Federal Circuit majority then placed copying and
"designing around" in subsidiary positions, stating: "copying suggests
that the differences between the claimed and accused products or
processes-measured objectively-are insubstantial,28 and
"designing around" suggests that "the competitor, presumably one of
skill in the art, has designed substantial changes into the new product
to avoid infringement." 282  However, in Warner-Jenkinson the
Supreme Court criticized this Federal Circuit explanation, stating that
it "leaves much to be desired." 2 83 At the same time, the Supreme
Court in Warner-Jenkinson did not shed any light on the relative
importance of the factors previously cited in Graver Tank, nor did it
provide a basis for determining what other factors might be relevant
in considering "the particular circumstances" of a case. 2 84 Rather the
Supreme Court generally lent support in Warner-Jenkinson to the
factors mentioned in Graver Tank.285
The Supreme Court, therefore, far from resolving the
disagreements among the judges of the Federal Circuit on the proper
application of the doctrine of equivalents, a goal which the Supreme
Court expressly set out to achieve in its Warner-Jenkinson opinion,2 86
left the disagreements in existence and arguably added to them. One
of the dissents in the Federal Circuit's Hilton Davis opinion had
expressed the view of three judges that the Federal Circuit majority
opinion "misconstrues the meaning of the factors other than the
substantiality of the differences."28 7 This complaint regarding the
meaning of the factors was not addressed by the Supreme Court in
279. Id. at 609.
280. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1518 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
281. Id. at 1519; see also supra notes 237-239 and accompanying text.
282. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1520; see also supra notes 237-238, 240 and accompanying
text.
283. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 35-36 (1997).
284. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1547 (Lourie, J., joined by Rich, J. and Plager, J.
dissenting) (discussing other factors that he believes should be relevant to a determination under
the doctrine of equivalents, including "any behavior of the patentee that impairs the ability of
the public to reasonably understand from the claims what is patented," and whether the patentee
knew of the potential non-literal infringement and failed to seek a reissue).
285. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 24-25.
286. Id. at 21.
287. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1547 (Lourie, J., joined by Rich, J. and Plager, J. dissenting).
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Warner-Jenkinson. Rather, the Supreme Court left the specifics of the
application of the doctrine of equivalents to the Federal Circuit: "[w]e
expect that the Federal Circuit will refine the formulation of the test
for equivalence in the orderly course of case-by-case determinations,
and we leave such refinement to that court's sound judgment in this
area of its special expertise." 2 88
The combination of the Federal Circuit's analysis in Hilton
Davis and the Supreme Court's failure to take up the Seventh
Amendment issue has caused confusion as far as the proper path to
take in making these "refinements" is concerned. The Federal Circuit
majority summarily defined away any trace of equity "in the technical
sense" 28 9 from its precedent. The Supreme Court failed to confront
the distinction between law and equity head-on in a proper Seventh
Amendment analysis. As a result, the substantive law regarding the
doctrine of equivalents has been left without "controlling bounds,"2 90
particularly for identifying and prioritizing relevant factors to be
taken into account in applying the doctrine. It is time for the Supreme
Court to address the Seventh Amendment issue it left unanswered in
Warner-Jenkinson, and take up the question of whether there is any
equitable basis for the doctrine of equivalents, and if not, to identify
the controlling basis for the doctrine.
2. Claim Scope and Infringement
The Federal Circuit's overly simplistic characterization of the
doctrine of equivalents as a theory presenting purely factual issues has
also led to complications and tension in the substantive law related to
the doctrine. This characterization was made in the context of
analyzing the Seventh Amendment issue in Hilton Davis,291 and it has
led to confusion in defining the very scope and character of the proper
inquiry involved in applying the doctrine of equivalents.
The confusion relates to whether the doctrine of equivalents
involves solely a factual determination of equivalency, or whether it
is a doctrine that also necessarily involves a legal analysis of claim
scope. Simply stated, the issue is whether the doctrine of equivalents
should routinely involve two steps: a determination of the relevant
permissible scope of protection for the claim, similar to but not the
288. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40.
289. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521; see also supra note 226 and accompanying text.
290. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1537 (Plager, Circuit Judge, with whom Chief Judge Archer
and Circuit Judges Rich and Lourie join, dissenting); see also supra note 265 and accompanying
text.
291. See supra notes 210-219 and accompanying text.
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same as claim construction, followed by the comparison of the
allegedly infringing product or process to the permissible scope of
claim protection.
Two years prior to the Federal Circuit's en banc decision in
Hilton Davis, a panel of the Federal Circuit in Wilson Sporting Goods
v. David Geoffrey & Assoc.,2 92 had unanimously endorsed a
hypothetical claim analysis in doctrine of equivalents cases. The
Wilson Sporting Goods case involved a patent related to golf balls
with a particular pattern of "dimples" that improve performance by
increasing the ball's lift. 29 3 The only theory of liability at issue was
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.2 94 Following a jury
verdict of infringement, the defendants moved unsuccessfully for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that the asserted scope
of equivalency would impermissibly encompass golf balls that were
already in the public domain and thereby improperly "ensnare the
prior art." 29 5
In addressing the issue on appeal, a Federal Circuit panel
explained that "a patentee should not be able to obtain, under the
doctrine of equivalents, coverage which he could not lawfully have
obtained from the PTO by literal claims," and therefore, "since prior
art always limits what an inventor could have claimed, it limits the
range of permissible equivalents of a claim." 2 96 In order to determine
whether the prior art limits the range of equivalents relevant to a
particular case, the Federal Circuit stated that "it may be helpful to
conceptualize the limitation on the scope of equivalents by visualizing
a hypothetical patent claim, sufficient in scope to literally cover the
accused product." 297 Once the hypothetical claim is defined, a
determination must be made as to whether the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) could have allowed such a claim in light of the prior
art.2 98 If such a claim could not have been issued in light of the prior
art, it would not be proper to allow the patentee to obtain that
coverage under the doctrine of equivalents in a subsequent
infringement suit.299 If such a claim could have been properly issued
292. Wilson Sporting Goods v. David Geoffrey Assocs., 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990),
overruled in part on other grounds, Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83
(1993).
293. Id. at 679.
294. Id. at 683.
295. Id at 678, 681-83.
296. Id. at 684.
297. Id. (emphasis added).
298. Id.
299. Id.
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by the PTO, then application of the doctrine of equivalence is not
barred by the prior art.3 oo
The Federal Circuit treated the hypothetical claim analysis as an
issue of law in Wilson Sporting Goods. 30 ' This approach was
consistent with the Federal Circuit's precedent at the time, which
classified the issue of whether an asserted scope of equivalents should
be barred by the prior art as an issue of law to be reviewed under a de
novo standard on appeal.302 Since the decision in Wilson Sporting
Goods, hypothetical claim analysis has been consistently treated as an
issue of law.303 It is an analysis that cannot result in and of itself in a
determination of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
Rather, as set forth in Wilson Sporting Goods, a determination may be
reached under the hypothetical claim analysis that the range of
equivalents asserted is not barred as a matter of law.304 If the asserted
range of equivalents is not barred, there must be a subsequent finding
of equivalency between the claim asserted and the accused product or
process in order to establish infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. 3 05
Despite the Federal Circuit's decision in Wilson Sporting Goods,
setting out in detail a legal analysis to be performed to determine if
the range of equivalents asserted in a case under the doctrine of
equivalents is permissible as a matter of law, the Federal Circuit
majority in Hilton Davis stated that the application of the doctrine of
equivalents is purely factual. The court did so in order to deal
expediently with the Seventh Amendment issue it faced. This
involved some sleight of hand, as previously discussed,306 as well as
an absence of any reference to Wilson Sporting Goods in the majority
opinion. Referring to the Supreme Court's statement in Graver Tank
that "a finding of equivalence is a determination of fact," the Federal
Circuit majority in Hilton Davis restated the proposition in an
unprincipled manner: "infringement, whether literal or under the
300. Id.
301. See id. at 683-85.
302. See Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan Medical Indus., 888 F.2d 815, 821 (Fed. Cir.
1989); see also Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (cited in
Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 683-84).
303. See, e.g., Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamar Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1322-
23 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Hilton Davis Chem. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512,
1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., joined by Archer, C.J. dissenting).
304. Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684.
305. See id. ("but we presume that the jury resolved underlying evidentiary conflicts in
Wilson's favor").
306. See supra notes 201-2 10 and accompanying text.
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doctrine of equivalents, is a question of fact." 307 Of course, it is well-
established law that a literal infringement analysis is a two step
process, involving, first, the construction of a claim, and, second, a
comparison of the accused product or process to the claim as properly
construed.3 08 Since the first of these steps, claim construction, has
been defined by the Federal Circuit itself in Markman as an issue of
law, and described by the Supreme Court as a "mongrel practice"
including issues of law, the Federal Circuit's above-quoted statement
in Hilton Davis regarding infringement is not correct as far as literal
infringement is concerned. In addition, given the hypothetical claim
analysis in Wilson Sporting Goods, setting forth an initial legal
determination of permissible claim scope to be followed by a further
comparison of the claim and the accused product or process, the
Federal Circuit's above-quoted statement in Hilton Davis is also
incorrect as far as infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is
concerned.
The substantive law in general concerning the steps involved in
determining infringement under the doctrine of equivalents has been
muddled. Prior to the Federal Circuit decision in Hilton Davis and
since, the steps involved in determining infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents have been described repeatedly as involving,
first, the construction of the claims, and, second, a comparison of the
accused product or process to the construed claim to determine
whether each element of the claim is present either literally or
equivalently. 3 09 However, the law has also recognized a number of
specific legal limitations on the application of the doctrine of
equivalents, including the prior art, dedication to the public, and
307. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1520 (emphasis added); see supra notes 205-206 and
accompanying text.
308. See, e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir.
1996) ("A literal patent infringement analysis involves two steps: the proper construction of the
asserted claim and a determination as to whether the accused method or product infringes the
asserted claim as properly construed."); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,
976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("An infringement analysis entails two steps. The first step is determining
the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed. The second step is
comparing the properly construed claims to the device accused of infringing.").
309. See, e.g., Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) ("It is well settled that an infringement analysis involves two steps: the claim scope is
first determined, and then the properly construed claim is compared with the accused device to
determine whether all of the claim limitations are present either literally or by a substantial
equivalent."); Young Dental Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Q3 Special Products, Inc., 112 F.3d 1137, 1141
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (citations omitted) ("An infringement analysis involves two steps. First, the
claim scope is determined without regard for the accused device. Second, the properly construed
claim is compared with the accused device to determine whether all of the claim limitations are
present either exactly or by a substantial equivalent.").
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prosecution history estoppel.3 10 Many of these legal limitations are
currently raised as defenses. 1 The substantive law of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents is therefore, at best, inelegant in its
organization of these principles as far as defining an orderly approach
to the application of the doctrine of equivalents is concerned. In many
instances, however, the statements of substantive law in this area are
completely inconsistent. The Federal Circuit's characterization of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents as purely an issue of
fact is possibly the most egregious of the inconsistent statements, and
has led to confusion in the application of the doctrine.
The issue of whether the application of the doctrine of
equivalents should be considered a pure issue of fact, as opposed to a
mixed issue of fact and law, was one that expressly divided the
Federal Circuit judges in addressing the Seventh Amendment issue in
Hilton Davis, as previously discussed.3 12 It is an issue that goes to the
heart of the doctrine of equivalents. Judge Nies clearly articulated the
missing link in this substantive area of the law. In a dissent in Hilton
Davis, in discussing the unclear distinctions set forth in Federal
Circuit precedent between findings of equivalency and legal
limitations on the doctrine of equivalents, Judge Nies proposed a clear
unification of the legal questions involved in applying the doctrine of
equivalents:
Properly understood, as previously explained, these questions
are merely subparts under the larger question of the scope of
protection to which the claim is entitled. We have, however, never
articulated that under the doctrine the scope of equivalents is a
separate legal question.
In sum, I conclude that a finding of infringement under the
doctrine is a mixed question of law and fact. 313
The Federal Circuit majority's flawed analysis of the Seventh
Amendment issue in Hilton Davis rests in part on the intermediate
conclusion that infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is
310. See, e.g., Albert W. Preston. Jr. & Dianne B. Elderkin, Malta v. Schulnerich: The
Federal Circuit at a Crossroads in Its Search to Harmonize Substantive Patent Law with Jury
Trial Procedure and Review, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 49, 61 (1992) (In an article that predates Hilton
Davis, the authors noted that the application of the doctrine of equivalence "has become much
more 'legal,' and relatively less an exercise of fact finding.").
311. See, e.g., Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1322-29 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (raising prior art as a defense of ensnarement).
312. See supra notes 210-219 and accompanying text.
313. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1579 (Nies, J., joined by Archer, C.J. dissenting) (citations
omitted).
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purely an issue of fact. This oversimplified and faulty intermediate
conclusion stands between the current unclear statements of
substantive law on the application of the doctrine of equivalents and
the unifying clarification proposed by Judge Nies. In order to rectify
the situation, it is time to revisit the Seventh Amendment analysis and
reassess the flawed intermediate conclusion that infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents is a pure issue of fact.
3. Claim Scope Under the Doctrine of Equivalents Versus
Claim Construction
The Federal Circuit majority's flawed analysis of the Seventh
Amendment issue in Hilton Davis has contributed greatly to a
fundamental tension in the law between claim scope under the
doctrine of equivalents and claim construction. This tension is another
problem related to the unprincipled intermediate conclusion that
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is purely an issue of
fact. It also relates back to the Federal Circuit's Markman decision,
and the fact versus law dichotomy which the Federal Circuit
articulated in its analysis of Seventh Amendment issues in that case,
an analysis which the Federal Circuit has continued to apply despite
the Supreme Court's very different approach to Seventh Amendment
issues.
From a theoretical perspective, explanations in the case law as to
how the doctrine of equivalents relates to claim construction have
been problematic. In many instances these explanations have revolved
around convoluted reasoning as to why the doctrine of equivalents
does not affect claim scope.3 14 In an attempt to rebut the dissenting
views of Judge Nies in Hilton Davis, the Federal Circuit majority
proclaimed that the level of protection under the doctrine of
equivalents is the same as that provided by the doctrine of literal
infringement:
This dissent errs, however, in arguing that the application of the
doctrine of equivalents enlarges the claim scope. Instead the
doctrine of equivalents provides the same protection to the
substance of the claim scope provided by the doctrine of literal
infringement. As explained in Graver Tank, when there are no
substantial differences between the claimed and accused products
or processes, "they are the same" in the eyes of the patent law. 315
This assessment of the doctrine of equivalents was not only rejected
314. See, e.g., Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1528.
315. Id. (citations omitted).
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in Judge Nies' dissent in Hilton Davis, it is not widely accepted by
scholars and practitioners, who view the doctrine of equivalents as
expanding the scope of protection,3 rather than providing "the same
protection to the substance of the claim scope provided by the
doctrine of literal infringement." 3 17
It is true that many of these thorny explanations existed in the
case law before the analysis of the Seventh Amendment issue in
Hilton Davis. For instance, the Federal Circuit panel in Wilson
Sporting Goods engaged in what might be described as sophistry in
dealing with the relationship between claim construction and the
doctrine of equivalents:
This court on occasion has characterized claims as being
"expanded" or "broadened" under the doctrine of equivalents....
Precisely speaking, these characterizations are inaccurate.
To say that the doctrine of equivalents extends or enlarges the
claims is a contradiction in terms. The claims-i.e., the scope of
patent protection as defined by the claims-remain the same and
application of the doctrine expands the right to exclude to
"equivalents" of what is claimed.
The doctrine of equivalents, by definition, involves going
beyond any permissible interpretation of the claim language; i.e., it
involves determining whether the accused product is "equivalent"
to what is described by the claim language.
While these problematic explanations may not all have had their
genesis in the flawed Seventh Amendment analysis of the Federal
Circuit majority in Hilton Davis, that analysis has made clarification
of the substantive law in this area impossible by declaring that
application of the doctrine of equivalents is purely factual. At the very
least, as Judge Nies stated, the doctrine of equivalents presents legal
issues related to "the scope of protection to which [a] claim is
entitled."019 In order to bring clarity to the substantive law addressing
the relationship between claim construction and the doctrine of
316. See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine ofEquivalents and Claiming the
Future After Festo, 19 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 1157, 1167 (2004) ("Whatever equivalency standard
is applied, the modem doctrine necessarily expands patent scope .... ); Allen N. Littman, The
Jury's Role in Determining Key Issues in Patent Cases: Markman, Hilton Davis and Beyond, 37
IDEA 207, 233 (1997) ("It is suggested that the trial judge should determine whether the
proposed equivalents are permitted. That, along with literal interpretation, would determine the
scope of patent protection.").
317. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1528.
318. Wilson Sporting Goods v. David Geoffrey Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir.
1990), overruled in part on other grounds, Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S.
83 (1993).
319. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1579 (Nies, J., joined by Archer, C.J. dissenting).
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equivalents, the majority's characterization in Hilton Davis of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents as purely a question of
fact should be addressed and corrected.
In addition to theoretical problems concerning the relationship
between the doctrine of equivalents and claim construction, the
Federal Circuit's continuing reliance on its own fact versus law
approach to Seventh Amendment issues has also lead to tension from
a practical perspective. As one attorney has aptly pointed out: "[w]hy
should the scope of a patent under the doctrine of equivalents be
determined by a different entity than the one who interprets a patent
generally?" 320 I believe that this incompatible result has followed
directly from the Federal Circuit's oversimplified "flip sides"
approach to Seventh Amendment issues, which originated in the
Federal Circuit's Markman decision. 3 2 1 This "flip sides" approach to
claim construction and determinations of infringement preordains
opposite Seventh Amendment results: claim construction is viewed as
a pure issue of law for the court, while infringement, including the
application of the doctrine of equivalents, is viewed as a pure issue of
fact for the jury.
In effect, the Federal Circuit made a policy trade-off in its
approach to Seventh Amendment analyses in Marknan. The Federal
Circuit defined claim construction as purely an issue of law for the
judge in a move it believed would further its policy goals of certainty
and uniformity. Of course, as a matter of historical fact, the Federal
Circuit acknowledged in its Markman decision that patent
infringement cases were tried to juries in 1791,322 a circumstance that
ensured that some aspect of a patent infringement suit must be
preserved for jury determination under the Seventh Amendment. 3 23
The Federal Circuit subsequently defined the doctrine of equivalents
as an infringement issue and a pure question of fact in Hilton Davis.
Under a rigorous Seventh Amendment analysis in keeping with
Supreme Court precedent, there would be no automatic trade-off in
reaching a determination as to whether a judge or jury decides issues
of claim construction versus those under the doctrine of equivalents,
and no need to define any of these tasks as pure issues of law or fact.
The tension inherent in having a judge determine issues of claim
construction and a jury apply the doctrine of equivalents has caused a
320. Littman, supra note 316, at 225.
321. See supra notes 208-210 and accompanying text.
322. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 984 (Fed Cir. 1995).
323. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377 (1996).
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further ripple effect stemming from the Federal Circuit's Seventh
Amendment analyses. This ripple has invaded the substantive law of
prosecution history estoppel.
III. PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL
A. The Festo Decisions of the Federal Circuit and the Supreme
Court
The relatively recent litigation between the Festo Corporation
and Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Company has produced a
number of important decisions related to prosecution history
estoppel.32 4 Prosecution history estoppel is a limitation on the
doctrine of equivalents. 325 Under this theory of estoppel, arguments or
amendments made during the prosecution of a patent before the PTO
may limit the range of equivalents that can be asserted under the
doctrine of equivalents.326 The basis for the estoppel is that a patentee
may not take one position before the PTO in order to gain allowance
of a patent and then take a contrary position in an infringement action
by attempting to reclaim through the doctrine of equivalents coverage
relinquished during patent prosecution.327
The substantive law of prosecution history estoppel has recently
undergone tremendous change in the course of the Festo litigation.
The Festo litigation involved allegations of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents, and raised issues regarding the extent to
which prosecution history estoppel limits or bars such allegations of
infringement.328 The relevant claims of the patents involved in the
litigation had been amended during prosecution, although the reasons
for the particular amendments were not clear. 32 9 Judgment in the case
was originally entered for the plaintiff based on infringement under
324. See supra note 16.
325. See, e.g., Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30 (1997).
326. See, e.g., Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376-77
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
327. See, e.g., id at 1376; Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571,
1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
328. See generally Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722
(2002) (litigating patents involved in the litigation related to magnetically coupled rodless
cylinders).
329. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F. 3d 558, 583-84
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (claims of one patent amended during prosecution of the patent
application, claims of other patent amended during a reexamination proceeding), vacated, 535
U.S. 722 (2002).
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the doctrine of equivalents.330
On an initial appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected the defendant's
argument that prosecution history estoppel precluded infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents.33 ' The Federal Circuit quoted its
decision in Hilton Davis, applying the so-called "flexible bar" which
had been well established in its cases: "[w]henever prosecution
history estoppel is invoked as a limitation to infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents, a close examination must be made as to, not
only what was surrendered, but also the reason for such a
surrender."3 3 2 Under the flexible bar approach, even if prosecution
history estoppel is triggered, once an examination is made of what
was surrendered by the amended language and the reasons for the
amendment, there may be a range of equivalents that is still available
under the doctrine of equivalents.333 In fact, under existing precedent
at the time, the limiting effect of prosecution history estoppel on the
doctrine of equivalents in any particular case could fall "within a
spectrum ranging from great to small to zero."334
A little over a year after the original appellate decision was
issued in Festo, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Warner-
Jenkinson, and granted certiorari in the Festo case, vacating the
original appellate Festo decision and remanding the case for further
consideration. 33 5 In its Warner-Jenkinson decision, the Supreme
Court affirmed the continuing validity of prosecution history estoppel
as a limit on the doctrine of equivalents. 3 36 The Court also rejected an
argument that the reason for making an amendment during patent
prosecution should be considered "irrelevant" in determining whether
an estoppel arises,337 stating that its past precedent "consistently
applied prosecution history estoppel only where claims have been
amended for a limited set of reasons."338 The Court noted that the
330. Festo, 234 F.3d at 585. Judgment was entered following the grant of a partial
summary judgment of infringement of one patent under the doctrine of equivalents and a jury
finding of infringement of the other patent under the doctrine of equivalents.
331. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857, 863-64 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), vacated520 U.S. 1111 (1997).
332. Id. at 864 (quoting Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d
1512, 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
333. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see
also LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 867 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1989); Dixie USA, Inc. v. Infab Corp., 927 F.2d 584, 588 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
334. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1363.
335. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. v. Festo Corp., 520 U.S. 1111 (1997).
336. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29-30 (1997).
337. Id.
338. Id. at 32.
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reasons typically relate to amendments made to avoid the prior art.339
The Court in Warner-Jenkinson introduced a new presumption to deal
with situations in which no reason for an amendment is established in
the record.340 In such cases, the Court established a rebuttable
presumption that there is a "substantial reason related to patentability"
for the amendment, and stated that prosecution history estoppel would
bar the application of the doctrine of equivalents. 34 1 The Court placed
the burden of establishing the reason for an amendment on the patent
holder. 342
On remand, the Festo case was eventually taken up by the
Federal Circuit en banc.34 3 In a fractured and fractious decision, the
Federal Circuit radically changed the rules for prosecution history
estoppel in a manner that severely limited the availability of the
doctrine of equivalents. Among its more modest holdings, the Federal
Circuit majority held that prosecution history estoppel would be
triggered by any narrowing amendment made for any reason relating
to the statutory requirements for obtaining a patent, and was not
- - 344limited to amendments made to overcome prior art rejections. In its
most drastic holding, the Federal Circuit majority overruled seventeen
years of its own precedent by replacing the "flexible bar" approach,
which it deemed "unworkable," with a "complete bar." 34 5 The Federal
Circuit held that if an estoppel arises as the result of an amendment to
a claim, there can be no application of the doctrine of equivalents to
the amended claim element.34 6 This latter "complete bar" rule,
combined with the wide range of reasons that the Federal Circuit
announced would trigger prosecution history estoppel, severely
curtailed the availability of the doctrine of equivalents. However, the
Federal Circuit majority deemed that it would advance the goals of
certainty and predictability in providing notice to the public regarding
the scope of protection provided by a patent.347
The holding was vehemently denounced by four Federal Circuit
339. Id. at 31.
340. Id. at 33.
341. Id. at 33-34.
342. Id. at 33.
343. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, (Fed. Cir.
2000) (en banc), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002). A Federal Circuit panel had earlier taken up the
case on remand and issued a decision affirming in part, vacating in part and remanding (Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 172 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999), vacated, 187
F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (en banc).
344. Festo, 234 F. 3d at 563, 566-68.
345. Id. at 564, 569-78.
346. Id
347. Id. at 575-78.
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judges in multiple dissents, who variously saw the complete bar
approach as contradicting Supreme Court precedent, lacking
sufficient justification for overruling Federal Circuit precedent, and
adversely impacting inventors and the process of obtaining patents.348
The Supreme Court again granted certiorari in the Festo case to
review the controversial en banc decision of the Federal Circuit. 349
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal
Circuit's complete bar for limiting the doctrine of equivalents under
prosecution history estoppel. 3 50 Focusing on the limitations inherent
in words, and the difficulty of precisely describing things using
words, the Court emphasized the importance of not limiting the reach
of a patent to its literal terms in order to achieve "appropriate
incentives for innovation." 3 ' The Court stressed that the doctrine of
equivalents achieved this result, a goal that the Court had repeatedly
held to be worth the cost of creating some uncertainty in patent scope
in opinions spanning from 1854 through 1997.352 The Supreme Court
viewed a complete bar in applying prosecution history estoppel as
inconsistent with this fundamental goal of the doctrine of
equivalents.353 Therefore, the Court stated that while a narrowing
claim amendment may be viewed as a concession by the inventor that
the patent rights do not extend as far as the original claim, the
amended language may still be "an imperfect fit" for the invention. 35 4
As a result, the Court identified three categories in which a narrowing
claim amendment should not be equated with the surrender of a
particular equivalent. First, if the equivalent was "unforeseeable at the
time of the amendment."355 Second, if the particular equivalent bears
"no more than a tangential relation" to the rationale for adding the
amendment. 5  Third, if for "some other reason" a patentee could not
reasonably have been expected to describe the particular
348. Id. at 598-619 (Michel, J., dissenting) (discussing both Supreme Court precedent and
Federal Circuit precedent that had endorsed a flexible bar approach and pointing out that the
Federal Circuit was not free to change the flexible bar approach because it would contradict
Supreme Court precedent); id. at 619-20 (Rader, J., dissenting) (discussing the detrimental
impact of the complete bar in the context of after-arising technology); id. at 620-29 (Linn, J.,
dissenting) (focusing on the lack ofjustification for the drastic change in the law brought about
by the complete bar approach and the adverse consequences to inventors and the process of
patent prosecution); id. at 630-42 (Newman, J., dissenting).
349. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 533 U.S. 915 (2001).
350. Id. at 722, 724, 737.
351. Id. at 731-32.
352. Id. at 732-33.
353. Id. at 737-38.
354. Id. at 738.
355. Id. at 738, 740.
356. Id. at 740.
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equivalent.35 7
In rejecting the complete bar, the Supreme Court did not
reestablish the former flexible bar. Rather, it introduced another
rebuttable presumption to be applied with the rebuttable presumption
introduced in Warner-Jenkinson. Under this second rebuttable
presumption, a patentee who has made a narrowing amendment in
patent prosecution is presumed to have surrendered any equivalent
falling between the original claim and the amended claim. 3 58 The
patentee bears the burden of rebutting the presumption by proving
that a particular equivalent was not surrendered because it fell within
one of the three categories enumerated above.359
After establishing a second rebuttable presumption, the Supreme
Court remanded the Festo case to the Federal Circuit for further
consideration in light of its decision.360 The Federal Circuit responded
by adding additional complexities to the substantive law of
prosecution history estoppel, which are described hereinafter.
B. The Federal Circuit's Push to Change the Rules for
Prosecution History Estoppel to Minimize the Availability of
the Doctrine ofEquivalents
There is no doubt that the Federal Circuit majority attempted to
drastically reduce the availability of the doctrine of equivalents in its
first en banc decision in Festo. By adopting a complete bar approach
to the application of prosecution history estoppel in any instance in
which a narrowing claim amendment was made to satisfy the
statutory requirements for issuance of a patent, the Federal Circuit
attempted to change the substantive law to ensure that the doctrine of
equivalents would be unavailable per se in many instances.
While the Federal Circuit's push to reduce the availability of
prosecution history estoppel is often analyzed in terms of the court's
general desire to provide more certainty and predictability in the law
of claim scope, I believe the en banc Festo decision was also heavily
motivated by its recent Seventh Amendment decisions. In applying a
simplified fact versus law analysis to Seventh Amendment issues in
its Markman and Hilton Davis decisions, the Federal Circuit reached
opposite results for claim construction and the doctrine of equivalents,
the logical conclusion of its "flip sides" approach. The judge is
357. Id. at 740-41.
358. Id.
359. Id..
360. Id. at 742.
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entrusted with claim construction but the jury is handed the
application of the doctrine of equivalents. The tension is enormous.
The jury in many cases holds the power to effectively override a
district court's careful construction of patent claims by finding
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.3 61
In considering the likelihood that Seventh Amendment issues
played a major role in the Federal Circuit's push to minimize the
availability of the doctrine of equivalents in its first en banc decision
in Festo, the timing of the decisions is significant. The Federal Circuit
panel decision in the initial Festo appeal was issued within a few
months after the issuance of the Federal Circuit decision in Hilton
Davis.362 At that time, the panel applied prosecution history estoppel
as a flexible bar to the application of the doctrine of equivalents, and
affirmed the lower court judgment of infringement.3 63 On the other
hand, by the time the Federal Circuit's first en banc decision on the
merits in the Festo case was issued, the Federal Circuit's Markman
decision assigning claim construction to the judge was approximately
five and a half years old, and the Seventh Amendment outcome in the
case had been affirmed by the Supreme Court.3 64 In addition, the
Federal Circuit's Hilton Davis decision assigning application of the
doctrine of equivalents to the jury was over four years old, and the
outcome on the Seventh Amendment issue in the case had been left
unreviewed but undisturbed by the Supreme Court. 36 5 The tension
created by entrusting claim construction to the judge while delegating
the application of the doctrine of equivalents to the jury had been
361. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 955, 958 (2007) (noting that juries can undo the work of claim
construction by applying the doctrine of equivalents).
362. The Federal Circuit's panel decision in the initial Festo appeal was issued on
December 14, 1995. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857 (Fed.
Cir. 1995). This was just over four months after the issuance of the Federal Circuit decision in
Hilton Davis. The latter was issued on August 8, 1995. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-
Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
363. See supra notes 331-332 and accompanying text.
364. The Federal Circuit's first en banc decision on the merits in the Festo case was issued
on November 29, 2000. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc). This was over five years and seven months after the Federal Circuit's
Markman decision was issued. The latter was issued on April 5, 1995, and affirmed on April 23,
1996. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff'd,
517 U.S. 370 (1996).
365. The Federal Circuit's Hilton Davis decision assigning application of the doctrine of
equivalents to the jury was issued on August 8, 1995 (Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir.
1995)), over four years earlier than the Federal Circuit's first en banc decision on the merits in
the Festo case, which was issued on November 29, 2000 (Festo Corp., 234 F. 3d 558 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (en banc)). The Supreme Court left the Seventh Amendment outcome in the Federal
Circuit's Hilton Davis decision undisturbed in a decision issued on March 3, 1997. Warner-
Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
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building. Moreover, this tension provided a new and more immediate
pressure to limit the doctrine of equivalents. By contrast, the concern
that the doctrine of equivalents renders the scope of patent protection
less certain is not new, and has been aired in the case law since 1854,
as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Festo.366
While the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's attempt
to establish a complete bar in the law of prosecution history estoppel,
the resulting substantive law has become more and more complex as
compared to the previous flexible bar approach.
C. Confusion and Complexity in the Substantive Law of
Prosecution History Estoppel as a Ripple Effect of Seventh
Amendment Decisions
"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"
"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat.
Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, Lewis Carroll, Chapter 6
It is clear that the Federal Circuit majority would like to take the
path of restricting the doctrine of equivalents. While the Federal
Circuit's attempt to do just that by applying prosecution history
estoppel as a complete bar was rejected by the Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court did not reinstate the flexible bar. Rather, it replaced
the complete bar with a rebuttable presumption of a complete bar.367
The Supreme Court set out three general categories to be examined in
determining whether the patentee had met its burden of rebutting the
presumption of a complete bar.368 The Court then remanded the Festo
case to the Federal Circuit to determine whether Festo could rebut the
presumption that the narrowing amendments made during patent
prosecution barred all equivalents falling between the original claims
and the amended claims.369
On remand, the Federal Circuit introduced additional
considerations. First, the Federal Circuit held that the question of
whether the presumption of surrender of an equivalent had been
rebutted was a question of law for the court, again briefly analyzing
366. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. at 732-33 (2002).
367. See supra note 358 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 355-357 and accompanying text.
369. Festo, 535 U.S. at 741-42.
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this Seventh Amendment issue by focusing on a law versus fact
distinction.370 The Federal Circuit acknowledged that there may be
underlying questions of fact in determining if a rebuttal is established,
but briefly stated that it was proper for the court to decide factual
issue that underlie a legal question.371
Next the Federal Circuit set forth "general guidance" on the
application of the three categories available to support a rebuttal.372
With respect to the first category, establishing that the alleged
equivalent was "unforeseeable at the time of the amendment," the
Federal Circuit stated that this involves an objective inquiry from the
perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art gauged at the time of the
amendment. 3 73 The court also stated that later-developed technology
or technology not known in the relevant art would "usually" not be
considered foreseeable. On the other hand, the court stated that old
technology, while not necessarily foreseeable, "would more likely" be
foreseeable.3 74 With respect to the second category, that the
underlying reason for the amendment bears "no more than a
tangential relation" to the equivalent in question, the court stated that
it was hard to "anticipate the instances of mere tangentialness that
may arise." 75 However, the court stated that an amendment made to
avoid prior art encompassing the equivalent would not be
tangential.3 76 The court also stated that the inquiry should focus on
the "objectively apparent reason" for an amendment based upon the
prosecution history.377 Finally, with respect to the third category,
namely that the patentee establish "some other reason" why it was not
reasonable to have described the particular equivalent, the court stated
that the category is "vague" but "narrow," and may be satisfied based
upon "the shortcomings of language." 378
370. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1368-69
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc).
371. Id. at 1368-69, and 1368 n.3. It is interesting to note that in a footnote the Federal
Circuit attempted to retreat from its prior Markman statements that claim construction is purely
an issue of law. Id. at 1368 n.3. The court cited its Markman decision as indirect support for the
proposition that a court may properly decide issues of fact underlying issues of law. Id.
However, it is ironic that the discussion referenced in Markman as indirect support actually
states that while a court may consider extrinsic evidence in its discretion in the course of claim
construction, in doing so "the court is not crediting certain evidence over other evidence or
making factual evidentiary findings." Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 981
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original).
372. Festo, 344 F.3d at 1369-70.
373. Id. at 1369.
374. Id
375. Id
376. Id
377. Id. at 1369-70.
378. Id. at 1370.
2011] 399
400 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 27
As a result of the Festo decisions, the law of prosecution history
estoppel has become enormously complex and confusing, to say the
least. The flexible bar approach that pre-dated the Federal Circuit's en
banc decision in Festo was far simpler and more elegant in theory
than the current system of rebuttable presumptions, categories of
rebuttal and associated factors. Moreover, the complexity of the
current law of prosecution history estoppel has in turn caused
instability. As Judge Rader noted in discussing recent changes in this
area of the law, the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence has been moving
at "lightning pace," which "can engender uncertainty about the
consequences of each new rule." 3 79 As discussed, I believe the current
complexities in the substantive law of prosecution history estoppel
can be traced back to the flawed analyses in the Federal Circuit's
Markman and Hilton Davis cases. In applying a fact versus law
approach to Seventh Amendment issues, an approach not employed
by the Supreme Court in addressing such issues, the Federal Circuit
set a wave in motion that has caused numerous ripples. The Federal
Circuit's overly simplified "flip sides" approach preordained opposite
Seventh Amendment results for claim construction and the doctrine of
equivalents. These opposite results in and of themselves have created
enormous tension. This tension in turn has generated pressure to
remedy the situation by manipulating the substantive law of
prosecution history estoppel to minimize the availability of the
doctrine of equivalents. I view this as a Seventh Amendment ripple
which has led to enormous complexity and confusion in the
substantive law of prosecution history estoppel.
The tension that I believe has led to this final ripple effect would
only be removed if the Seventh Amendment outcome in the Federal
Circuit's Hilton Davis decision were reversed, so that judges decide
issues related to the application of the doctrine of equivalents. As
Judge Plager noted in a concurring opinion in the Federal Circuit's
first en banc Festo decision, the complete bar was "a second-best
solution to an unsatisfactory situation." 380 The better solution he
identified was to declare the doctrine of equivalents to be rooted in
equity and therefore assign questions of its applicability to judges.
I believe the best path towards attempting to resolve the tension
leading to this final ripple effect is to revisit the underlying flawed
379. Id. at 1376 (Rader, J., concurring).
380. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 593 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
381. Id.
THE SEVENTH AMEND. RIPPLE EFFECT
Seventh Amendment analyses. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
determine the result of a principled Seventh Amendment analysis of
the issue raised in Hilton Davis, which would entail an extensive
review of precedent under the historical approach. The purpose of this
article is to point out the flaws in the Seventh Amendment analyses
contained in the Federal Circuit's Markman and Hilton Davis
decisions, and to point out the problems that have been created in
substantive patent law as a result. The tension creating the final ripple
may or may not be resolved through a proper analysis of the Seventh
Amendment issues. The other problem areas in substantive patent law
discussed herein would be improved as a result. On balance, I believe
the flaws in the Federal Circuit's Seventh Amendment analyses,
together with an appreciation of all of the resulting problems that
have arisen in substantive patent law, more than justify
reconsideration of the underlying Seventh Amendment issue in Hilton
Davis, which the Supreme Court left undecided, as well as correction
of two of the Federal Circuit's primary errors in its intermediate
conclusions, namely that claim construction is purely an issue of law
and that application of the doctrine of equivalents involves purely an
issue of fact.
CONCLUSION
Seventh Amendment issues in patent cases should be analyzed in
a principled manner, consistent with Supreme Court precedent. While
the ultimate decisions reached on such issues are important, the
analyses employed in reaching the decisions are also critically
important. Oversimplified statements and faulty intermediate
conclusions set forth in the course of flawed Seventh Amendment
analyses, often employed to reach results perceived to foster certainty
and uniformity, can in turn have independent, dramatic and adverse
effects on the development of substantive patent law.
In the area of claim scope, flawed Seventh Amendment analyses
by the Federal Circuit in its majority opinions in Markman and Hilton
Davis, based principally on a fact versus law approach, have resulted
in confusion, tension and conflict in a wide array of substantive law
issues related to claim construction, the doctrine of equivalents and
prosecution history estoppel. The Supreme Court has added to the
problems by failing to expressly point out the errors in the Federal
Circuit's flawed analyses. In its Markman decision, the Supreme
Court performed an in-depth Seventh Amendment analysis of the
issue of whether a judge or jury should construe claims, which the
Federal Circuit majority had failed to do. Moreover, the Supreme
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Court expressly declined to apply a fact versus law approach to the
Seventh Amendment issue. However, in affirming the outcome
reached by the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court failed to expressly
point out the error in the approach taken by the Federal Circuit. As a
result, the Federal Circuit has relied upon its own prior faulty analysis
in Markmnan over and over again. In its Warner-Jenkinson decision,
the Supreme Court fostered more confusion by not only failing to
decide the Seventh Amendment issue in the case, but by voicing
approval in dicta of the Federal Circuit's decision on the Seventh
Amendment issue while expressly reserving judgment.
It is time to clean up the Federal Circuit's flawed analyses of
Seventh Amendment issues in patent cases. The stakes are high. The
issues are important. The ripple effect is huge. The Supreme Court
should stop showing such extreme deference to the Federal Circuit in
an area of constitutional importance. The Federal Circuit's
oversimplified statements and faulty intermediate conclusions
characterizing claim construction as purely an issue of law and
application of the doctrine of equivalents as purely an issue of fact
should be corrected, either by the Federal Circuit itself or by the
Supreme Court. The underlying Seventh Amendment issue in Hilton
Davis, which the Supreme Court left unreviewed, should be
reconsidered and analyzed in a manner consistent with Supreme
Court Seventh Amendment precedent. Correcting errors in the
treatment of Seventh Amendment issues in patent cases will go a long
way towards rectifying problem areas in the substantive law of claim
scope.
